

DOSSIER

IN THE SHADOW OF "JUST" WORDS

- From one genocide to the next P3
- Overuse of the term genocide P4
- A deadly confusion P5
- Violation of humanitarian law P7

MISSIONS

SUDAN

Situation still fragile in Darfur P8

DRC

A fragile transition P12

CHINA

Street children P14

SIERRA LEONE

Psychological assistance to liberian refugees P16

DEBATES

Genocide in Rwanda P18

RESOURCES

- National staff volunteering to leave on mission P24
- Turnover and Positions to fill P28

INFOS

Press review P26
Watch and read P26



MANIP AND PROPAGANDA

In the shadow of "just" words

MSF / September 2004 / Bénédicte Jeannerod, Deputy Director of Communications / Translated by Lyn Lemaire

Beyond our disgust and horror at the assassination on June 2nd of five of our volunteers in Afghanistan, it is imperative that we also address the question of our independence within the context of crises such as these, in which identities are often confused. Is not producing our own discourse and analyses the first step towards distancing ourselves from any interest other than that of the people we assist?

Following September 11, the zeal with which the powers of the "Axis of Good" have intervened on enemy territory has been manifest, as in all wars, in the use of propaganda and expressed through a carefully chosen vocabulary. From Afghanistan to Iraq, Chechnya to the occupied Palestinian territories, it is, of course, the word "terrorism" that has invaded hawkish discourses and that serves as the corners-

tone of military operations. This radicalization of objectives, which demonizes the enemy, is accompanied by a radicalization of practices on the part of powers that elsewhere brandish the flags of civilization and Human Rights. Special crimes deserve special treatment: to embark on the fight against terrorism permits the United States, Russia (who did not wait for September 11, 2001), Israel and, potentially, any other

Number 132

Although rare, it was not so much the editorial committee who chose the main theme of this issue – but rather the number of contributions sent to us or public statements made in the press. In their own way, each contributor has attempted to underline a form of rhetoric that is impregnating the current climate. By screaming "the crime of all crimes", mixing military with humanitarianism or brandishing terrorism to justify intervention, words do have concrete implications and often serve political interests. Producing our own words is therefore the starting point to providing efficient assistance, away from amalgams detrimental to our work. It also means defending our independence from any power, in the sole interest of the people we help. This involves distancing ourselves from propaganda and resisting this era of confusion.

DOSSIER

In the shadow of "just" words

→ The title of this dossier refers to the latest MSF publication is the 'Populations in Danger' series. 'In the shadows of just wars' analyses the limits and contradictions in the humanitarian aid operations implemented during the most serious crises "In the shadow of just wars"/MSF/edited by Fabrice Weissman/Hurst and Company/ September 2003

state wanting to rid itself by force of a given enemy, to exonerate itself from adherence to international conventions. We saw this, for example, in the assassination of hundreds of Afghan prisoners of war in 2002 at Mazar-I-Sharif, or in the obscene treatment inflicted on

Special crimes deserve special treatment: to embark on the fight against terrorism permits the United States, Russia (who did not wait for September 11, 2001), Israel and, potentially, any other state wanting to rid itself by force of a given enemy, to exonerate itself from adherence to international conventions.

every Chechen, civilian or combatant, suspected of belonging to a terrorist camp, etc. The rhetoric that accompanies these crimes tries to convince public opinion that these enemies are special, that they are not like other human beings, and that, consequently, these crimes are not crimes. The weakness of both public and state reactions in the face of these massive acts of violence demonstrates the marketing success of President



→ Ramallah, Palestinian Territories © Juan Carlos Tomasi - 2002

Bush and his communication advisors. Even within the MSF movement, the Mazar massacre unleashed but little emotion.

To a lesser degree, another term now holds the spotlight: that of "genocide," which was so belatedly employed in Rwanda in 1994 and so promptly unsheathed in Darfur. Resorting to this terminology says much about the racist representation of African conflicts in the West (the conflict in Darfur reduced to an inevitable antagonism between Blacks and

Arabs). It also demonstrates, as if it were necessary, that words are used by States not for what they mean but for the political objectives that they might serve. It was not enough to emphasize the ferocity of the repression wrought by the Sudanese army and its militias and the amplitude of the violent acts that were committed, it was necessary to resort to this utmost designation in order to give weight to the threat of sanctions. Why have we chosen to cover this topic in Messages? Why organize a debate on genocide at rue Saint-Sabin (see p. 18)? Why do we think it so important to use the right words at the right moment? Simply put, to

... words are used by States not for what they mean but for the political objectives that they might serve

reflect on the contexts in which we work and to make an effort to characterize these contexts is essential not only in order to set ourselves apart from the analyses produced by states or political interest groups, but also, and above all, in order to define the space in which we work and to provide appropriate assistance. Another word appeared at the moment of the beginning of this war in Iraq: "embedded," to designate journalists who covered the war from inside coalition tanks. To produce our own discourse is also to refuse to climb into the tank... ■



→ Iraq © Geert van Kesteren - May 2003

From one genocide to the next?

Doctor Jean-Hervé Bradol, president of Médecins Sans Frontières
Translated by Christopher Scala

On September 9, after the US Congress unanimously adopted the resolution, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell - followed closely by the two presidential candidates- insisted again on the notion of genocide to qualify the events in Darfur. Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, what questions does this raise?

In June 1994, I met with Donald Steinberg, a member of the National Security Council. Returning from Kigali, I had come to ask the United States to provide UN forces with armoured transport vehicles to protect wounded civilians threatened with extermination while being evacuated. At the time, Mr Steinberg believed that what was taking place against the Rwandan Tutsis was genocide, but he refused to use that word. The application of the word genocide would have triggered the legal obligation to intervene incumbent upon signatory States of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). The recent American debacle in Somalia (1993) had led the United States to limit its foreign military interventions to the strict defence of its vital interests. Acting to put an end to the extermination of Rwandan Tutsis did not fall under this category. In August 2004, the US Congress unanimously adopted a resolution qualifying the Darfur situation as genocide. What has changed over the past 10 years, between the events in Rwanda and in Sudan, is the United States' perception of threats to its national security and strategic interests. The Sudanese regime is high – although not first – on the Bush Administration's list of US enemies.

Despite the obvious political opportunism, the evolving use of the term genocide nevertheless finds legitimacy in a scrupulous reading of international criminal law. According to the 1948 Convention, for the massacres committed in Darfur by the army and pro-government militias to be consi-

dered genocide, they must reflect "the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". In the case of Darfur, those who support the use of the word genocide assert that the action of the "Arab" militias targets the destruction of the "African" tribes. This argument is based on the assumption that Sudan is populated by two races: Blacks and Arabs. The biological notion of race, abandoned several decades ago, has been resurrected on the pretext of a strict interpretation of an international convention, which is being taken out of its historical context.

Any suggestion that the notion that race is irrelevant and even dangerous will be countered by the assertion that the overwhelming majority of Sudanese consider social strife to be

The biological notion of race, abandoned several decades ago, has been resurrected on the pretext of a strict interpretation of an international convention, which is being taken out of its historical context.

the product of society's racial division. It is undeniable that the idea of race is prevalent in Sudan, as in the United States - two countries with a history of slavery where society remains strongly characterised by the everyday use of racial categories. But this does not in itself lend support to an argument that racial classification is relevant. It does, however, give a clear indication of the pernicious influence that the past history of



→ Chad, refugees © Olivier Jobard / SIPA PRESS - February 2004

racism and slavery continues to exert on political decisions.

The need to revive the notion of race to support the premise of genocide in Darfur is not the only point of weakness in the genocide argument. Public statements of the intent to destroy a human group have been no more obvious than the existence of distinct races. No traces of this intent can be found in statements by the Sudanese dictatorship or in the country's laws. In short, the alleged intent to destroy a human group is not obvious, and the definition of the group of victims is based on a category that was rightly invalidated many years ago.

The argument of genocide in Darfur, although not universally accepted, has been welcomed by human rights organisations and humanitarian bodies. Deep down, the driving force behind this embrace is as political as the unanimous vote of the US Congress. The accepted phraseology describing this political project

presented for our approval is the right to intervene in response to serious and massive human rights violations. For those who support the construction of this new international order founded on the ambitious promotion of human rights (by armed force if necessary), progress has not been fast enough. They blame the inertia of the super powers, as reflected by the current functioning of the United Nations Security Council.

In response to this inaction, the use of the terms "crime of crimes" and genocide offers a sure advantage. Among serious human rights violations, the word genocide most clearly invokes an obligation of intervention, not only afterwards as punishment, but before or during the course of events to prevent or stop them. According to this mindset, the primary goal is no longer to determine if the extermination of Rwandan Tutsis and the Darfur massacres are sufficiently similar as historical events to be grouped in the same legal category, but rather to increase the frequency of

DOSSIER

In the shadow of “just” words

→ The Swedish Foreign Affairs minister was the first to use, on May 9, the word genocide to describe the events in Darfur when he described the situation as ‘resembling genocide’. The word was then used several times before being officially ‘adopted’ by the US House of Representatives on July 22. It was then used repeatedly – at times to be rejected, as in the case of the European Union on August 9 – until the declaration by Colin Powell reaffirming the genocide situation one month later. This was immediately repeated by Georges Bush and the next day by John Kerry, who declared in front of the New Orleans National Baptist Convention that the United States could ‘simply not accept another Rwanda’. Two days later in front of congressmen and black politicians in Washington he described it as ‘the second African genocide in ten years’.

vigorous international action in response to serious crimes. If applying the term genocide to the crimes committed in Darfur produces the desired effect – enforcing the law, by force if necessary – then the requirement of characterising markedly dissimilar events in the same way becomes secondary.

Incidentally, support for the genocide argument implies the belief that the permanent members of the Security Council have the resolve and power to put an end to the most serious crimes all over the planet. In view of the list of permanent members of the Security Council (China, United States, France,

... the alleged intent to destroy a human group is not obvious, and the definition of the group of victims is based on a category that was rightly invalidated many years ago.

United Kingdom and Russia) and their recent history, along with the frequency and complexity of the conflicts in which human rights violations are major, the naivety of this position is astounding. When the whole world is aware of the extent of torture carried out in the American prisons in Iraq and of the gravity of the

crimes perpetrated by the Russian army in Chechnya, it is strongly tempting to note, alongside naivety, a good dose of cynicism in this position.

Independence is an essential precept of humanitarian aid workers so as not to be perceived by the combatants as taking part in the hostilities. Respect for this principle requires eschewing projects aimed at establishing a new international political order and concentrating our efforts on imple-

menting impartial assistance. But a reminder of principles is not always enough to ensure compliance with them, given the temptation to enlist in the construction of a new world that is always presented as better by definition. A careful examination of the arguments in favour of the right to intervene, alongside the track record of modern international military interventions, should be enough to convince us to avoid going down this path. ■

EXCERPT FROM CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a) Killing members of the group;
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- a) Genocide;
- b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- e) Complicity in genocide.

Overuse of the term genocide

MSF / September 2004 / Marc Le Pape, Member of the Board of Médecins Sans Frontières
Translated by Carley Hydusik

With the forthcoming debate on the Rwandan genocide (see page 18), Marc Le Pape discusses the notion of genocide and emphasizes its specific nature. Given the, widespread use of this term today - used to describe almost anything - we are losing the true sense of the word...

According to official discourse, the world has supposedly witnessed two genocides since the beginning of 2004. First Darfur, then the Gatumba massacre in Burundi (13 August 2004). I don't think the notion of genocide as defined in 1948 applies to these two situations, but it's not hard to understand why the term is used.

Large-scale massacres of civilians by pro-government militias, villages

plundered and destroyed, large population displacements and the risks that accompany them: these mass murders and terror campaigns serve to justify the use of the term “genocide” to describe the events in Darfur. Whatever the underlying political interests of certain groups may be, many people seek to use the strongest term possible in order to trigger the large-scale assistance

needed to respond to the disaster. Nevertheless, according to the MSF teams, “the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic group” has not been attested.

In Burundi, the victims were refugees who fled the Bukavu region in June 2004. These refugees, a large number of whom are Kinyarwanda speakers who have lived in Congo for years, feared that the Congolese army would

engage in murderous reprisals against them when it regained control of Bukavu. The region had been occupied by a dissident military officer, General Nkunda, who is a Kinyarwanda speaker. The Gatumba massacre was selective; most of the victims were Kinyarwanda-speaking, often called "Banyamulenge", or "Congolese Tutsis". At the funerals held in Gatumba, Azarias Ruberwa, the Vice-President of Congo, describing himself as a "member of this community, which has suffered genocide", stated, "What brings us together today is

called genocide. I have been following the statements of various people who, despite the strong condemnations, go only so far as to use the term "massacre". There is no question about it. This is a veritable genocide. And genocide should be called by its name. Here we are talking about the genocide of Banyamulenge, killed for the simple reason that they were born Tutsi. This is a genocide of Congolese Tutsis." During the same ceremony, the representative of the Rwandan government declared, "Rwanda is resolute in its determination never

again to tolerate acts of genocide anywhere in the world." He added that Rwanda is prepared to provide emergency assistance and to intervene in the event of genocide "such as in Darfur".

By coincidence, 150 Rwandan soldiers arrived in Darfur on August 15 on a mission to protect cease-fire observers.

As with Darfur, the term "genocide" has been used in the case of Gatumba to serve political ends. However this political manipulation only works if it is

masked behind the emotions conjured by recalling the Rwandan genocide.

The result is that, in these two situations, resorting to the use of the term "genocide" has many functions other than legal ones. It aims to mobilize emergency assistance, trigger military intervention, conceal political calculations, express an emotion, etc., rather than to provide an objective description of the acts by rigorously applying the notion of genocide as originally defined at the end of World War II, and as it was applied in the case of the Rwandan Tutsis in 1994. ■



humanitarian action by delivering "humanitarian" food drops during the first aerial strikes in 2001, deploying special forces in civilian dress who claim to be on a "humanitarian mission," and threatening to suspend humanitarian aid to populations in southern Afghanistan if they refuse to provide military information etc.. Winning the hearts and minds of civilian populations and encouraging them to cooperate with military forces are among classic and legal military techniques. On the other hand, presenting a combat tactic as a humanitarian operation blatantly violates that symbol, just as does, for example, using a Red Cross vehicle to transport weapons clandestinely alongside a patient.

After the defeat of the Taliban, donors required most NGOs and U.N. agencies to place themselves at the service of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and of the interim government. The majority of NGOs thus abandoned the independence essential to providing impartial aid and modeled their priorities on those of the new regime and its Western allies, who were still at war with the Taliban. That constitutes the second element of confusion - making it impossible to distinguish between a subcontractor working on behalf of a warring party and a humanitarian actor.

Finally, beyond retaliation for the September 11 attacks, the defense of human rights and international humanitarian law were presented as forceful arguments in favor of armed intervention in Afghanistan. Aid actors do not, of course, have a monopoly on the rhetoric they use. However, using the semantic and legal constructs that aid workers rely on for military ends, it is of no

A deadly confusion

MSF / August 2004 / Fabrice Weissman, research director at the MSF Foundation

Nine days after five Médecins Sans Frontières volunteers were killed in Afghanistan on June 2, 2004, a Taliban spokesperson offered the following justification for their murder: "Organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières work for American interests and are therefore targets for us." As horrific as the crime is that this accusation seeks to legitimize, the statement itself is hardly surprising given the confusion that currently characterizes the symbol of humanitarianism.

Obtaining the right of access to the battlefield from belligerents in order to provide impartial aid to non-combatants is a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Armies in the fields are not comfortable with the presence of foreign actors, who are always suspected of serving the enemy's interests. Under these conditions, the safety of international aid

workers, and their room to maneuver, is tied closely to the credibility of the humanitarian symbol under which they operate. That symbol says, "We refuse to take sides in this war. Our only goal is to provide aid to its victims." When all is said and done, the only protection humanitarian actors have is the clarity of their image. It must reflect their

position as outsiders to the conflict and the transparency of their intentions. However both coalition forces and the majority of aid actors have seriously abused this image in Afghanistan.

The first aspect of this confusion has been to camouflage psychological warfare and intelligence operations as

DOSSIER

In the shadow
of "just" words

surprise that aid workers are perceived as the vanguard of the expeditionary troops of the new "just wars." Paradoxically, certain aid actors are themselves helping to confuse the picture by holding that war can be the continuation of humanitarian aid by other means. In the belief that the worldwide export of market democracy is the highest philanthropic calling, this free-market, universalist movement considers any action to be "humanitarian" if it contributes to achieving that mission. Such actions include assisting and protecting "good victims" (those whose survival does not threaten the project's accomplishment), imposing economic sanctions, dropping bombs, and invading and occupying nations "guilty of massive violations of human rights." Consequently, organizations that take this position have no objection to supporting "just wars" and serving the governments that pursue them. From this perspective, one fairly close to Bernard Kouchner's vision, the term "humanitarian action" is only a euphemism for a colonizing mission that imposes -- by force -- institutions whose every feature is supposed to embody a value system believed to be universal.

This dilution of the meaning of humanitarian language, with its neocolonial undertones, has inevitably had disastrous consequences on the security and possibility of intervention for aid actors. In Afghanistan international aid actors are perceived as back-up troops to the Western intervention forces and their local partners, and as such have been victims of multiples acts of violence. Since March 2003, more than thirty Afghan humanitarian aid workers and nine international volunteers have been killed leading to a significant reduction in aid activities and to MSF's withdrawal from Afghanistan after a 20-year presence there. Let us be clear, however, that the murder of our colleagues cannot be reduced to "a terrible misunderstanding." Forces hostile to the interim government and to the Coalition intend to conduct a total war, one that accepts no compromise with the adversary, including to save lives. We are not so idealistic as to think that a clear understanding of our action principles would be enough to dissuade anyone from attacking us. The clarity of the humanitarian symbol may not guarantee absolute security but it is, nonetheless, an essential precondition.



→ Afghanistan, Kabul, MSF center in Darste Barshi
© Heidi Holzer - September 2003

The blurring of the humanitarian symbol and its disastrous consequences may be found in most places where international forces are deployed. These include, of course, Iraq, but this is also the case in countries where the humanitarian symbol encompasses U.N. peacekeeping operations and protection of non-combatants (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola etc.). Whatever their legitimacy, armed interventions intended to assist and protect civilian populations put aid workers' safety at risk from the moment they are deployed under the humanitarian banner. If a protection operation is to be serious, it necessarily involves the use of force against the enemy and, thus, potential non-combatant victims. How can a humanitarian organization provide aid to victims if it is equated with the "humanitarian" protection force in the fighting? This is the danger that threatens aid organizations in Sudan today. By brandishing the threat of armed intervention in Darfur in the name of humanitarianism, the Security Council and certain Western nations

are including humanitarian actors in their camp. In so doing, they are designating those actors as enemies in the eyes of Khartoum's authorities. And the authorities see threats of intervention as a genuine "declaration of war."

It may be good for the U.N. or Western powers to intervene in the Sudan to assist and protect the Darfur population. However, that is not a question for aid actors to decide. But conducting a "just war" in the name, and with the participation, of humanitarian organizations -- most often under cover of a questionable reading of international criminal law that trivializes the notion of genocide -- poses a deadly threat to aid organizations and the people they assist. After the Iraqi and Afghan populations, will the Sudanese people on the wrong side of the front line become the newest victims, abandoned by humanitarian organizations forced to evacuate the country after their symbol has been militarized? ■

Violation of Humanitarian Law

MSF/August 2004/ Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, legal director at Médecins sans Frontières. Translated by Angela Dickson

Alongside the publication in Russian of *The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law*, Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier reviews the propaganda tools used by the “dominant powers”. In the name of the war against terror, certain words are used to dehumanize the 'enemy' and to justify the violation of humanitarian law.

The war against terror, in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq and Chechnya, has been marked by the refusal to recognize and apply the status of combatant, and consequently of prisoner of war, to the majority of the opposing forces. This phenomenon is illustrated by the creation of the term 'illegal combatant' and the abuse of the word 'terrorist'. The dominant powers thus seek to avoid the implementation of humanitarian law which would ordinarily be applicable in a period of armed conflict, whether civil war or international, just as patriotic and military propaganda try to convince public opinion that humanitarian law is not designed for these new types of war.

On the contrary - humanitarian law is applicable as soon as a conflict situation between two opponents results in armed clashes of a certain intensity and duration. These laws are thus applicable to military action in the war against terror. In this case, terrorists are combatants whose methods of war are illegal. If they are captured, they must be recognized as combatants, and may be questioned and tried for war crimes: but in no event may they be detained without trial or tortured to obtain information.

→ IN THE SHADOW OF THE NEW LAW

The law of armed conflict can be said to rely on absolute symmetry between combatant and civilian status: when this first status is contested, the definition and protection of civilians is brought into question. Thus, in Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya, the entire civilian population is suspected of taking part in the conflicts or of supporting the combatants.

Speaking of the military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, asserted that the Geneva Conventions were 'obsolete'. The Russian authorities have displayed similar

reasoning by refusing to qualify the situation in Chechnya as an armed conflict. We might assume, then, that a new law would therefore be necessary for this new type of conflict. However, while novelty may be a progressive and saleable concept in marketing, in the legal field it is regressive: while we wait for a new law, there is no law at all!

pline, dedication and effectiveness of combatants depends on the existence of clear and just rules of combat. The tragic stories of veterans of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Chechnya show us that orders that are not justified by law and strict military necessity come back to haunt the perpetrators and permanently destroy the integrity and efficiency of combatants. However,

involving guerillas, the secret services of large countries and non-national military groups supported, to a greater or lesser extent, by foreign states. Today this system has become autonomous and has largely escaped the control of the former superpowers, the USA and Russia. The specificity of the current problem is therefore the extent of terrorism and



→ Grozny, Chechnya © Eddy van Wessel - December 1999

→ LESSONS FROM THE PAST

It should be remembered that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were amended in 1977 to take into account specific and problematic new forms of war: guerilla warfare, wars of independence, civil and insurrectional wars involving acts of terrorism and non-state actors.

The basis of humanitarian law is not humanism, it is the intimate knowledge and control of the power and mechanisms of destruction that are deployed in conflicts. The disci-

even if soldiers know that respect for the law is necessary for their own efficiency, it is often the opposite view that prevails at the heart of political power.

→ THE VIRUS OF TERROR

Insurrections, guerilla warfare and acts of terrorism are by no means new phenomena. The Cold War was just that: an impossible military confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs and numerous active conflicts in the rest of the world

the absence of a forum for political resolution. Waging war on terrorism without respecting the rules of war is to risk falling into the same terrorism.

The attitude of the United States in Iraq and of Russia in Chechnya illustrates the quotation from Nietzsche: 'He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster'. For if we admit that war is the continuation of politics by other means, we must not forget that politics is the primary means of conflict resolution. ■



SUDAN

Darfur: Situation still fragile

→ El Geneina, Darfur © Michaël Zumstein / L'œil public - August 2004



MISSION

SUDAN/DARFUR

MSF / September 2004 / Bénédicte Jeannerod / Translated by Justin Hillier

Following several months providing assistance to the displaced people in Darfur, our teams are now able to gauge the effects of the humanitarian aid distributed to the populations in the camps. Where aid programmes were implemented rapidly following the waves of violence, the situation has significantly improved. However, in those areas where it took longer for help to be provided, and where the fighting continues (like in South Darfur), the situation remains extremely precarious. The displaced are now – and will continue to be for several months still – completely dependant on aid. It is therefore essential that the action persists, that help gets through to the more isolated regions and that the distribution of food is stepped up.

In late June, we published a report on the consequences of the widespread violence committed against civilians. We exposed the shortage of aid and feared a famine “entirely due to political reasons”. What we are now seeing today in the areas where we are working is that the arrival of aid is at least holding the worst at bay. The situation, however, remains extremely fragile.

In the camps in West Darfur (Mornay, Zalingei, Nyertiti), we are seeing an improvement in health indicators and the context is less tense. For several weeks, the mortality rates have stabilized below the emergency threshold in the Mornay camp where there are 80,000 displaced: the crude mortality rate is 0.04 per 10,000 people per day (emergency threshold 1/10,000/day) and 0.6/10,000/day for children under five (emergency threshold 2/10,000/day). Zalingei – where there are 45,000 displaced – is witnessing the same trend. The number of children admitted to our feeding centres is decreasing.

→ SUSTAINED VIOLENCE

The situation is still very tense in some areas of the North and South. In the El Fasher region (North), entire villages were destroyed in late August, causing several thousands of people to flee. 20,000

people having fled attacks recently set up camp in extremely precarious conditions around Shariya and Muhajariya, to the east of Nyala, in South Darfur. A make-shift camp has also been set up near to the camp in Kalma, which already has 80,000 displaced. Also in Kalma, nearly 800 children are receiving care at MSF’s therapeutic feeding centre and the medical situation is still critical.

→ THE MEDICAL AND SANITATION SITUATION IS FRAGILE

The rainy season, which began mid-July and will continue through until October, is still an aggravating factor: this period is ideal for malaria, and there may well be a seasonal peak around October/November time, as well as respiratory infections and diarrhoea. These are the major disease people seek consultation for at our health centres.

Since June, the teams have also been coping with a Hepatitis E epidemic that is rife throughout Darfur and the refugee camps in Chad. This illness is particularly fatal among pregnant women (20% mortality).

There is also an extremely real threat of cholera; all the factors that promote its emergence are present. The teams have equipment on hand already should the disease rear its head.

→ LONG-TERM DEPENDENCE

The displaced who left everything behind are completely dependent on humanitarian aid. The majority of them have not been able to sow crops, their supplies have been destroyed or pillaged and they have no resources left to guarantee their survival. In spite of the harsh conditions in the camps, they have decided not to return home, mainly due to the on-going security risks this would entail. Consequently, it is essential that the aid continues to arrive and even be extended to more isolated regions. Our teams in West Darfur have gone to see “what is going on elsewhere” far from the larger camps. Any decrease in aid could have serious consequences. We are particularly concerned with regards to the general food distribution by the World Food Programme that didn’t achieve its August objective (16,000 tonnes distributed instead of the 21,000 tonnes required) and risks being under target for September.

Another concern is the relocation of the displaced and the way in which Khartoum’s authorities could implement this. The displaced should only return home if they want to and when there are sufficient security guarantees, which certainly isn’t the case at the time of writing. The humanitarian aid that could be provided to the home regions is contingent on these two imperatives. ■



→ El Geneina, Darfur © Michaël Zumstein / L’œil public - August 2004



MISSION

SUDAN/DARFUR

EL GENEINA / MORNAY

From one town to another

MSF / July 2004 / Caroline Livio (El Geneina) and Milton Tectonidis (Mornay) / Translated by Lyn Lemaire and Mary Cassidy

El Geneina and Mornay are two towns one hundred kilometers apart. Here are the descriptions of two different field visits, one in July to El Geneina and the other in September to Mornay.

→ AHDAMETA'S FACADE

Almost 20,000 people are piled into Ahdameta, one of three main camps around El Geneina, where a total of 80,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) have gathered. To walk through this camp is to penetrate into an abyss of poverty and neglect. At first glance, however, everything appears calm. The rains that flood the camp every night have also made the grass grow, covering the brick red earth with little green coats. Children run about, women work little patches of land here and there. One must therefore look a little deeper in order to see beyond this first impression that many would like to see presented as the reality, that of a quieted conflict in which time will soon allow these displaced to resume their normal lives. There are signs, however, that this appearance of serenity is only an illusion. The carcasses of goats and donkeys that the earth has yet to devour betray the extreme indigence of the IDPs, who were forced to flee attacks and violence bringing little or nothing with them. Animals starved to death for lack of money to feed them or adequate security to venture outside the camp.

Then there are the dozens of women who turn up with their children, sometimes with one, sometimes with several, at the feeding center opened a few days ago by MSF. A nutrition survey conducted in this camp showed that one out of four children suffers from malnutrition. The first day, the crowds were not immense. Some women had come just because they had seen the center being built and heard that children were cared for and fed for free, which is unheard of elsewhere. But everyday when the center opens, new mothers are there with their children.

Mariam thus arrived at the center with her little boy, barely a year old and severely malnourished. Settled here for the past seven months, she tells us of her daily suffering: the famous registration cards for the World Food Program (WFP) that she didn't get and that would have allowed her to benefit from several

– rare and unequal – food distributions. Days of searching for work in the city, often without success, sometimes without eating. Neighbors who sometimes give them just enough to prevent dying of hunger. The rain at night that transforms the arid ground into mud and demolishes the hut that one must try to rebuild the next morning. And the violence that chased them from their village, ever present. "We don't want to return home. We are left with nothing and we are scared. We will return only if all of the IDPs leave at the same time." On her face, a mix of fear, fury, and fatalism. But also of relief to see her son regain his strength. Like her, over a dozen women came to the MSF feeding center today. Like her, their infant, sometimes a newborn, will leave with his ration of food. Today only one, sick and very severely malnourished, was urgently rushed to the hospital, where another MSF team will provide the necessary care.

→ MORNAY, THE SITUATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER 2004

The general situation in Mornay at the beginning of September was totally different from the situation I found on my last visit in June 2004. The militia were expelled from the outskirts of the town over a month ago by massive deployment of police officers, many of whom are local people. The number of violent incidents immediately fell as a result. The police are deployed at several points along the road to El Geneina (10 km from Mornay), and people can be seen venturing further and further in search of forage and wood. Some are even setting off with tools to work in the fields around the abandoned villages. Pressure on the refugees to return home has recently become less frequent and more discreet.

The relative calm is reflected in the faces and dialogue of the people, the resumption of trade and bustling activity at the market, which is growing every day, and improvements and extensions to homes, although some districts are far more

disadvantaged than others. However, there is little information about the situation beyond the road. There are apparently several inhabited villages along a wadi (river) 30 km north of Mornay (including Rumeila). However, the change in the atmosphere does not mean that refugees in Mornay expect to go back to their villages any time soon.

The health indicators also suggest that the situation has stabilised. Mortality rates, calculated on the basis of data collected by our home visitors, are not only below the emergency threshold, but well below the African average. Despite the hepatitis E epidemic, which seems to be coming to an end, hospital admissions are falling. The number of consultations is also declining, with a reduction in the number of cases of diarrhoea, despite the increase in acute respiratory infections (because the nights are cold). The number of cases of malaria is increasing, but is still marginal, and very few severe cases have been recorded. The rainy season is coming to an end. Everything is green, and grasshoppers are more numerous every day.

There has been no general food distribution since the beginning of August. The World Food Programme (WFP) has promised to begin airdrops this week, using Ilyushins and Antonovs from El Obeid. The drop site is ready, and food distribution after the drops is likely to take 10-14 days if all goes well. Despite everything, admissions to the therapeutic programme are becoming less frequent (1-2 a day), discharges are increasing and the number of children aided by our programme is gradually declining; the current figure stands at 250. If the general distribution is a success, this figure can be expected to decline even further.

MSF's structures and activities have developed in the meantime. The hospital facilities are constantly improving; the pre-natal and maternity consultation programme is to be relaunched, and the logistics staff are awaiting the equipment needed to extend the supply of drinking water to the whole population. Concern's sanitation project is expanding, and latrines are multiplying. This NGO will also be opening a supplementary feeding centre shortly. ■

TELEX

→ Updated 4.10.04 Hurricane Jeanne in Haiti

Mid-September, hurricane Jeanne caused severe flooding in Haiti. In Raboteau, a shanty town west of Gonaïves, MSF Belgium has renovated a health centre to order to provide assistance to the population in need. Two old operating theatres are used for general consultations, one for psychological assistance and the other for child birth. While aid is starting to get organised in Raboteau, it is still difficult to get aid to the region of Port-de-Paix, further north. The French section is opening a healthcare support programme there (consultations, dressings, paediatrics) in the Immaculée Conception hospital. Eight tonnes of medical and logistic material will be sent by plane to Port-au-Prince.

Operation super-log

MSF / September 2004 / interview Aurélie Grémaud / Translated by Mary Davis

With a budget of over 10 million euros for the French section only, the activities in Darfur are one of MSF's largest emergency missions. Eric Barte de Sainte Fare, logistics supervisor, describes the means employed to assist the populations in Darfur.

"The biggest challenge we faced was to organize such a large-scale operation in an emergency. Everything had to be done, from the supply chain to setting up a water distribution system for 135,000 people at Mornay, Zalingei and Nyertiti."

→ 5,200 TONS OF FREIGHT

"This is the first time I've seen such large amounts of supplies transported for an MSF emergency operation, both on the national and international level: more than 5,200 tons of cargo were sent to Darfur at the end of August!

This supply chain is very expensive and it is the logisticians job to keep costs as low as possible. For example, the overall cost of a ton of Unimix (high-protein flour, ed.), bought for 410 dollars in Europe, is 1,050 dollars once it reaches its destination. On top of the purchasing price, loading and unloading costs as well as storage and transportation fees have to be added. A survival ration distributed by our teams during blanket feedings distributions*, consisting of 5 kg of high-protein flour and a litre of oil, costs 7 dollars per family.

The quality of the transported medicine, food and equipment is also fundamental and takes up a lot of time and energy. This is particularly true during the rainy season: Unimix is an active matter that must always be stored in dry places. Products also need to be reconditioned to prepare the food distribution."

→ 300,000 FOOD RATIONS

"I think this is the most impressive thing we've ever done. In Zalingei, in western Darfur, MSF distributes 18,000 rations in one day. This represents a population of around 40,000 individuals, each child accompanied by at least one person. One of the most important elements of a distribution is rapidity, because the people, who are weak, cannot wait for a long time in the heat or rain. This is how 9,000 rations are distributed in 4 hours. Since the emergency in Angola in 2002, we have designed a very smooth distribution system that has reduced the time that people have to wait. As soon as a person is registered and enters the distribution line, after having waited outside, he/she goes through in less than a minute. In spite of it all, these distributions are



→ Mornay, Darfur © Michaël Zumstein / L'oeil public - August 2004

quite overwhelming: the huge crowds waiting for aid generate a lot of stress and tension, and the situation can even degenerate."

→ WATER FOR 135,000 PEOPLE

"Supplying water is essential in these precarious situations where the risk of epidemics, cholera and diarrhoea increases with the density of the population. The population of Mornay, originally 5,000 inhabitants, is now 80,000 people. As a result, the clean water supply sources had become insufficient. At the beginning of the year we set up an emergency water supply system. With the rainy season, we had to re-evaluate the whole

system, which wasn't easy, even if we knew that the pools installed in the dried riverbeds of the wadi would be flooded as soon as the first heavy rains fell.

It is not easy to find a water supply source in a semi-dry zone; in Mornay, logisticians built four wells that were five meters in diameter by using pre-existing drilling sites. Yet nothing is permanently solved.

Within a few weeks, the problem will come up again: with the end of the rainy season, another solution needs to be found.

Yet it is not enough to extract and purify water. A distribution network, well spread out in the city or camp with enough ramps, needs to be created. We have organized 49 distribution ramps in Mornay, but this is barely sufficient for the whole of the population."

For the time being, we have succeeded in avoiding the worst-case scenario in the areas where we are working, but we're all on our last legs. This is an emergency that started a year ago, in September 2003, although it wasn't until December that the first teams were really able to work in the area. Furthermore, from December to March, we were the only organisation in the area. But we succeeded!" ■

* Blanket feeding: food distribution for children under 5 years and their families.

LOGISTICS IN FIGURES

SUPPLIES

- Over 5,200 tons of freight.
- 5 Full Charters

MEDICAL STRUCTURES

- 5 clinics
- 4 hospitals, with 200 hospital beds
- 4 therapeutic feeding centres, with 180 beds
- 1 operating theatre
- 2,200 sq. m medical facilities

DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SURVIVAL RATIONS 300 000 FOOD SURVIVAL RATIONS. A total of 825 000 rations will be distributed by December 2004.

WATER

- By the end of September, 2,700 cu. M/day of chlorinated water distributed in Mornay, Zalingei and Niertity. This represents 20 litres of water a day per person for 135,000 people.

- 55 cu. m of chlorinated water are distributed daily in our medical facilities.


SHELTER

- 375 rolls of plastic sheeting have been distributed in the city of Zalingei. This represents a roof for 4,500 shelters of 20 sq. m each.



MISSION

Democratic
Republic of Congo



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

TELEX

→ Updated 4.10.04 Burundi : end of our activities in the camps

With harvest time approaching, the fighting moving towards the north of Kivu and the measures taken by the Burundian government to close the camps where we are working, most of the refugees have returned home. Only one thousand, mainly Banyamulenge (Tutsis from Congo) who had been targeted in the attack on Gatumba, have decided to stay in Burundi. With help from the government and under the aegis of the UNCHR, they have been transferred to a camp in Gwasowe in the centre of the country where IMC will provide assistance.

A fragile transition

MSF / September 2004 / Aurélie Grémaud, Marc Le Pape / Translated by Steven Durose

Two years after a transitional government was created to find a political solution to the conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo still suffers outbreaks of violence. These act as a reminder that stability in the region will prove difficult to achieve as long as there are those who stand to profit from political stalemate and where individual interests are intertwined with solving the country's "essential" problems.

After almost five years of war, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo entered into a transitional power-sharing agreement in Sun City in 2002 in order to end the conflict. Rwanda and Uganda agreed to withdraw their troops (at the end of 2002 and May 2003 respectively) and a transitional government composed of members of the former government,

the main armed rebel groups (see box), the political opposition and civil society organisations was formed. A unified national army was created under the leadership of high-ranking army officials from the various parties. But the troops are still far from mixed and former armed groups continue to dominate the areas they controlled during the war.

The transitional government will come to an end when presidential elections are held in July 2005. Until then, the government aims to confine the rivalry between the various factions to the political arena, preventing a return to armed conflict. But recent events have shown that some groups still resort to violence, especially those with

POLITICO-MILITARY PARTIES

- RCD-Goma – Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma. Current leader: Azarias Ruberwa. A Rwandan-allied movement set up in 1998 in opposition to President L.D. Kabila after he expelled his former Rwandan allies from DR Congo. Following a failed attempt to capture Kinshasa, the group took control of the eastern Congo until the Sun City agreement.
- RCD-ML – Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement. Current leader: Mbusa Nyamwisi. Also known as RCD-Kisangani, the RCD-ML is a splinter group of RCD-Goma formed in May 1999. Initially backed by Uganda, RCD-ML has been torn apart by power struggles and in-fighting.
- MLC - Congolese Liberation Movement. Created in 1998 with backing from Uganda. Current leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba, a vice-president of DR Congo in charge of the economy and finance.
- RCD-National - Congolese Rally for Democracy-National. Current leader: Roger Lumbala. Based in northern Ituri, the RCD-N was initially backed by Uganda. RCD-N supports the MLC's attempts to seize control of areas rich in natural resources from the RCD-ML in 2001 and 2002.

leaders who feel excluded from power.

Rebels have already made two coup attempts in Kinshasa this year. There has also been a rise in insurgency in the east of the country, where a rebel military leader seized control of the town of Bukavu between May and June. Even Monuc, the UN mission in DR Congo, has been the target of violent protests. The mission was accused of doing too little to protect the population after 160 Congolese refugees of Rwandan origin were slaughtered in a UN camp in Burundi last August. While media attention is focused on Iraq and Darfur, there are very real fears that the Great Lakes region will once again descend into violent chaos.

→ FROM KIVU TO BURUNDI

The biggest obstacles to peace and reunification are found in the Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu provinces. This area was the scene of the earliest rebel attacks on the government in 1996 and 1998 and recent outbreaks of violence are a major cause for concern.

RCD-Goma, which once controlled Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu, has joined the transitional government. The leader of RCD-Goma is one of DR Congo's vice presidents and there are a number of RCD-Goma members of parliament. The interim government has also appointed several regional governors from among the movement's ranks. But the region is still torn between rival factions and interests. Each group is competing for military control, which offers political advantages and access to the country's rich natural resources. An RCD-Goma splinter group led by one of DR Congo's most powerful generals, Laurent Nkunda, is behind the continuing violence. Some warlords see no advantage in joining the transitional government and many fear being put on trial for their bloody pasts. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court recently started investigations into serious crimes committed in DR Congo since 1 July 2002. By joining the government, the warlords stand to lose the military and economic power they gained during the war.

Troops under the command of Colonel Jules Mutebusi, who was suspended from the new national army, took control of Bukavu on 26 May 2004, with the help of Laurent Nkunda. The dissidents captured the town from forces loyal to the recently appointed military governor. Rebels occupied Bukavu, the provincial capital of Sud-Kivu province, before loyalist forces recaptured it. The town was subjected to several days of looting and violence, including rape. The 700-strong Monuc force took no military action to prevent the rebels from taking the town from the pro-government forces. The mission's inaction turned an already angry population against the Monuc.

One hundred and sixty Congolese refugees of Rwandan origin were massacred at night on 13 August in a UN camp in Gatumba. The refugees had fled to Burundi following the capture of Bukavu. The identity of the men who attacked the camp, which is located four kilometres from the border, is still under question. The massacre could have destabilised the entire region: the president of RCD-Goma withdrew from the transitional government for several days, while Burundi and Rwandan closed their borders with RD Congo and threatened the country with retaliation and even war.

→ KEY QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED


The scale of the conflict has been declining since the beginning of September 2004 when the dissidents rejoined the transitional government. But a number of "key" questions, as they are called in Kinshasa, have yet to be addressed. One of the most pressing issues is nationality. President Mobutu granted Congolese nationality to the population of the eastern Congo, which has close links to Rwanda, before taking it away again six years later. One of the most important areas of disagreement between the various parties is what defines a Congolese citizen. The essential point is whether the Banyamulenge of Sud-Kivu (see table) and the Banyarwanda of Nord-Kivu are Congolese. It is vital that the issue is resolved before the closing phase of

the transition process - the presidential elections in June 2005.

→ CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN THE EAST

Although the most immediate threats to peace in the region have been reduced, the situation remains extremely volatile. The government of national unity installed in June 2003 has been unable to bring peace to the population of the eastern Congo. The area is at the mercy of armed groups who roam the countryside burning down villages and stealing food supplies. Rape and murder are commonplace. In February 2004, almost 70 villages were destroyed in the Kitenge region in northern Katanga, where MSF has been working since 2002. One

woman was shot dead in front of the MSF clinic as she sought help. In Gbadolite, in the country's equatorial region, where MSF has been treating the local population for trypanosomiasis, several rape victims were taken into care. The attacks are a direct consequence of the growing military presence in the region. Hundreds of families fleeing violence linked to recent troop reinforcements have arrived in Kayna, in Nord-Kivu, where MSF is battling against malnutrition. Armed men in these areas have been carrying out violent attacks against the local civilian population. The lucky few pay protection money or risk being stripped of their possessions and food supplies, while many have seen their houses burnt down and their wives and daughters raped. ■



THE BANYAMULENGE

Originating from Rwanda, the Banyamulenge have lived in Sud-Kivu for several generations. Relations between the Banyamulenge and other Congolese groups are strained. The Banyamulenge are frequently used as political pawns by Rwanda and DR Congo. They have faced growing hostility over the last six years and Rwanda cites the need to protect them to justify its presence in DR Congo. But the alibi is purely political: Rwandan troops killed dozens of civilians when they attacked Banyamulenge villages in 2002.



MISSION

China



CHINA / BAOJI

→ Chine © Asushi Shibuya / MSF - 2001

An alternative to the streets

MSF/September 2004/ Isabelle Merny / Translated by Rosalind Mendy

M. does not exactly have the life that an adolescent of her age should have: she lives at the MSF centre for children in difficulty in Baoji, China.

110

children have returned to their families in the past three years, and a dozen of the "older" ones have found work.

→ Baoji, China
© Isabelle Merny - July 2004



M. has never known her parents. She only knew her grandfather. Finding herself alone on his death, she had to manage on her own: but her nomadic childhood meant she did not go to school. Helpless, she let herself be taken to a clandestine drug factory where she worked hard for a year in order to eat and have somewhere to sleep. She was never paid: instead she was often insulted, even threatened with death when she talked about leaving. She was a prisoner and says she 'seized her chance' the day she managed to escape. After a period of aimless wandering, M. arrived at the centre.

→ BAOJI : RAILWAY JUNCTION

Baoji, in Shaanxi province in the centre of China, is an intersection point of the numerous railway lines that criss-cross this country 50 times the size of France. Many street children get onto trains that bring them here, sometimes after a journey of more than 40 hours. The MSF centre in Baoji opened in March 2001, in collaboration with the Chinese Civil Affairs Office. The aim of the programme is to offer a stable environment for children and the right condi-

tions for their recovery (temporary lodging, access to medical and psychological care, and to schooling). Once the child has recovered, physically and mentally, the social work begins. This involves finding the child's family and re-establishing contact and dialogue with his/her close entourage so that eventually the child is no longer marginalised and can return to live at home in the best possible conditions. The centre is not a solution, but an alternative to life on the street. Three expatriates -one doctor, one psychiatrist and one specialised educator- are currently devoting themselves to this task together with thirteen Chinese staff - one nurse, seven educators, two teachers and three social workers.

→ 300 CHILDREN IN 3 YEARS

Orphans like M., abandoned children like K. - this little boy of 8 who does not want to remember the evening in July when his father left him in the street - children 'lost' in the turmoil of a railway platform, or rejected after a divorce, children who are one mouth too many to feed, or handicapped ... They are all 'burdens' for their families. Some have been sold or given away; others have

run away from home and the mistreatment and abuse they suffered. 33 children currently live at the centre. Aged between 8 and 17, the girls and boys arrived here after having been rounded up by the police, or were dropped off by compassionate strangers. A new child arrives every week on average. They have the choice: stay or leave. Over the past three years nearly 300 children have chosen the former solution. A few are wary, put off by their experience of child institutions, and prefer to go back on the streets. But, like L., they know that if the need arises they can always find help at the centre. He even brings other children here that he meets on the streets - children even younger or more vulnerable than himself.

150 000 cases of vagrancy concerning children under 16 are recorded each year on the streets of China's towns. Alone or in groups, they beg or collect plastic bottles, which will be resold by weight for a pittance. Sometimes passers-by take pity on the youngest ones and give them a little money or food; the 'bigger' ones have to deal with the hunger, cold and rejection on their own. ■

“I always bear in mind our future separation.”

MSF/September 2004/ interview by IM / Translated by Rosalind Mendy

Françoise Oppenot, a paedopsychiatrist at the MSF centre, describes her experiences with the children in difficulty in Baoji. The search for their families, their identities etc. Other than the physical and psychological help, there is a considerable of administrative work to be done for these children, who often have complex social backgrounds.

« I had a first taste of working with children in difficulty with Médecins Sans Frontières in Armenia. Armenian and Chinese children are in the same pitiful state, the institutions look the same, but here their experiences are much more severe. Here we do not know the identity of some children, or even their origin. That is the social workers' main task, hunting down the families, reconstituting identities. It is a very long and tedious administrative job.

Here at the centre, not a single child has a « normal » family (a father and a mother who are still alive). They are often orphans or else their parents are separated. They are then sometimes taken in by an adoptive family, an uncle or a grandparent, and when the latter dies they are really all on their own. Here, when a couple gets divorced, the father often has custody of the children. He then gets married again and sometimes the new wife, the stepmother, who already has her own children, will reject the children from the first marriage. For many children at the centre, that all happened when they were very young, between 2 and 6 years old. They now have no contact with their real mother, and sometimes do not even remember her!

80% of the children have been mistreated, beaten, often by the « adoptive » family who took them in, before being abandoned in the streets of Baoji, or elsewhere in the country, particularly in the poorest provinces. They wander round the streets, collecting empty bottles that they sell by weight, and have to beg to stay alive. The youngest children always say they came across nice people who gave them food. For the older children things were not so easy. They are rounded up in the streets or escorted to the relief centre by adults (the relief centre is an administrative body responsible for referring them elsewhere).

We have between 30 and 40 children in the centre and every week, on average, a new child joins us. I see the new arrivals as a matter of priority, several times. That enables me to pick out those who need more than just educational support, the more vulnerable ones. I do not want to develop too deep a relationship with the children and become too attached, because afterwards, when the psychologist has finished his/her mission and leaves, it is a new tragedy for the child, and the children have already suffered too much, they have been separated too

clearly behind at school, and not mature when it comes to controlling their emotions. They are often intelligent, but unfortunately many of them have never been to school. They also suffer from inhibition at school, finding it difficult to concentrate and pay attention. There are 2 or 3 special cases of children who need to see psychiatrists, but it is difficult to contact local psychiatrists. It is difficult to make correct diagnoses, as these children develop virtually “experimental” pathologies that may be likened to mental retardation or psychotic disorders. They



→ China, Baoji © Isabelle Merny / MSF - July 2004

often. We do not stay long enough to get too involved: we might stir things up we cannot control. I try to spread the children's affection around, organize meetings with other people, such as the educators. I always bear in mind our future separation.

One of my aims here is also to train the Chinese staff, as I think about what is coming later. Médecins Sans Frontières will not always be here. The educators have to pay more attention to the psychological aspects of their work. The children in the centre are greatly lacking affection. They are very agitated and want a lot of attention. They are

have had seven or eight different homes. At least half of them have suffered all sorts of physical and moral abuse. Such cases are very difficult to treat in an institution.

On the whole, I am struck by their ability to resist. Some children have managed to find a balance, but a fragile balance. A new catastrophe must be avoided at all costs! The stories I hear are terrible, but their drawings are very gay, which means they have a good psychic structure. The children work quite well in class, which is really extraordinary in view of what they have

been through and what they have seen! It is true that though the drawings show lost paradises, enchanted landscapes, break-up and sadness are nonetheless present. The children remain very vulnerable.

How about returning to their families? That is not so easy. First we have to find the family, and the family has to accept to take the child back. There is also the problem of the Houko, an administrative document a bit like the French “livret de famille”. Without this residence certificate, it is impossible to obtain identity documents. The Chinese do not have the right to live outside the district marked on their Houko. Those who live outside the limits are Ming Gong, people who have no identity papers, no home and no right to work. The social workers go from one town hall to another searching for families and Houkos. The children are confused

I do not want to develop too deep a relationship with the children and become too attached, because afterwards, when the psychologist has finished his/her mission and leaves, it is a new tragedy for the child, and the children have already suffered too much, they have been separated too often.

about going home. Even after having suffered atrocities, they remain attached to their families. They want to know they exist, where they come from etc. In fact they would like to see their families, but not stay with them. Others have no idea where they come from, and do not remember their parents or their date of birth. These children have identity problems.

If there were less poverty in China, families would be more stable. Too many children come back to the centre after returning to their families. The parents say themselves that their children will be much better off at the centre than with them. They even thank us. Some children have been here for a long time, though that is not the centre's aim – it is supposed to be an alternative. We would like to make the relevant authorities aware of the situation, so they can continue our work when we leave.” ■

Healing Group

Médecins Sans Frontières / August 2004 / Muriel Génot, clinical psychologist / Translated by Melanie Stallard

MISSION

Sierra Leone

Médecins Sans Frontières is responsible for the health of the Liberian refugees living in the Taiama and Tobanda camps in Bo, Sierra Leone. Some of them have been deeply affected by the wars that have punctuated the history of Liberia over the last 14 years. There is an expatriate psychologist at the camp, helped by two assistants and one (or several) translator(s). This gives the refugees the possibility of receiving psychological care. Muriel Génot, a clinical psychologist, describes her work with the refugees between October 2003 and April 2004.



→ The drawing's story told by the illustrator : This drawing is about Foya. " This are the six people they killed. This cannot walk, but has a stick. My drawing is about the way people has been killed during the war. People were suffering during the war. " The title : War is not good.

For a psychologist, helping patients means finding the right time and the right place to contain the suffering. Each case is different. The place may be a consultation room and a one to one dialogue, or else the patient's home and family, or even his/her neighbourhood. It may also be a group, a group of peers, which we know to be a very significant culturally throughout Africa. What follows is an example of this type of work, through the experience of two groups of teenagers – one group of girls, and the other boys, who were patients between February and April 2004 in the Taiama camp in Sierra Leone.

→ THE TIME AND PLACE

The place existed before the group. It was called the « isolation room », a little house, seven metres by four, with a door, four windows and a sheet metal roof. It was set apart, but situated within the boundaries of the Médecins Sans Frontières clinic. These details were important. The very set-up conveyed messages. To

the teenagers and above all their families, in a cultural context where there are no psychologists, the set-up said that we were offering care. More specifically, to the teenagers it said that the care was to be given in a framework where there were rules to be respected, such as confidentiality; and the door closing behind the group gave a concrete form to that confidentiality. For the community (the Liberians in the camp), the "psychologist's house" came to mean that the war was not just their tragic destiny, just a time gone by to be forgotten. It meant that beyond the penal and social responsibilities that were not within the psychologist's scope, there were feelings of guilt and moral suffering, personal wars that prolonged the effects of armed conflict, sometimes making it impossible to live together in the present. The desire to forget often requires first recalling what happened.

The care was also given in a set timeframe, divided up into several sessions that lasted a few months. (In this particular case there were ten sessions for each of the two groups). For therapeutic reasons, sessions were organized with a start time, an end time, and a first and last session. We thus proposed, though it may have been frustrating, a foreseeable and anticipated framework, that was totally different from the traumatic no-limit regime that made everything possible, even the unthinkable. To voice the unthinkable, which nonetheless came about, and which was the source of all the teenagers' suffering. That is how we measured the progress made.

During the first sessions, most of the teenagers spoke of being confronted

directly and individually with a relative or peer's violent death. In every case, the teenagers, whose ages ranged from thirteen to eighteen years, needed to find a balance again (which seemed impossible after their traumatic "initiation"), a balance both within themselves and with their families, whom they had either found again or lost, but in all events the families were wounded and unable to help them.

→ TWO GROUPS

After the first sessions, two groups were set up, one with seven boys who spoke *kissi*, and the other with six young girls who spoke *mende*. The sole aim of this division was to create the best conditions for the participants to express themselves freely, because adolescence is a time when the gender issue makes it more complicated to speak in a group; and also because the language of feelings tends to be spontaneously one's mother tongue. The teenagers' words, noted down in their entirety, the original drawings given to us by the boys, as well as the photos of the young girls' paintings, are particularly valuable material that reflect the therapeutic progress made by these thirteen Liberian teenage war survivors.

The boys group was distinctive in that it was made up both of teenagers who had taken an active part in the fighting – the « ex-fighters » – and teenagers who had come up against and fled the armed groups fighting in Liberia. This decision about the group's composition came of the following observation: the Liberian conflict, like other conflicts, was a powerful recruiter of young cannon fodder, and it comple-

tely changed the traditional categories of executioners and victims.


Among the child soldiers were teenagers who had been torn away from their childhood by traumatic seduction methods that clouded the lines between those responsible for exactions and their victims. What remains after the conflict is a label, and that label is very clear. It alienates the teenagers definitively, both from the community and from themselves. It becomes their new identity. To avoid accepting this exclusion ourselves, we chose not to offer a specific therapeutic option for the ex-fighters, but to open the group up to other teenagers.

→ A'S EXPERIENCE

A. was one of the teenagers who took part in the fighting. When the schools closed in the county of Lofa, he believed it was a « solution » for escaping the passiveness he had been forced to accept. He agreed to learn how to use a weapon, like other boys his age. He certainly did not see himself becoming the head of a group later on, which is what he became, first assailant then attacked, and always afraid, whatever happened. Months later, he was still reliving the fear and the fighting in his nightmares. He told us his story, almost without a break, at our first meeting. His mother lives in the camp, not far away, but he cannot live with her. He wants to break with the past that haunts him, and he tries to overcome his anxiety by smoking marijuana every day. He sums up what he wants in a short sentence that could easily come from the mouth of one of the others, from the community, or from his family, "I want to change". Today in Taïama, a Liberian refugee camp in Sierra Leone, being an « ex-fighter » is a recipe for exclusion and also confers a "tough guy" reputation. It is a war trophy, but also the only garment that fits.

A. arrived at the first group session to share the suffering and depression caused by this situation. At the start of the second session another boy started speaking. He asserted that since they had been participating in the group, as if by magic the community had changed its opinion

of the ex-fighters it had once considered in a negative way. A. then told of a mini event that had happened in the camp the week before. There was a queue of people at the water pump. He was used to using well-practised intimidation methods to push in and avoid waiting. He knew how to play



→ The drawing's story told by the illustrator: "This is my friends Fallah and Joseph, this is Muriel in Taïama calling us to come to her, and the fighters with the gun in Foya".

on the fear he inspired by reminding the children there of his supposed "brutality" so that they gave up their places to him without hesitation. He did the same again this time, but then, thinking of what was at stake, he thought better of it, apologized profusely and started to wait like the others. When we listened to him telling his story, not without self-mockery, we grasped how much he was "staggered" by the risk he had taken, for it really was a risk, of becoming a nobody, just someone falling back into line. He had found internal freedom again, the freedom

of choice, of weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the anachronistic and pernicious identity resulting from his traumatic experience. Although he himself, and the group, considered the change as having come from outside, I would like to believe that the "kindly" attitude attributed to the community was mostly the result of his own internal progress, progress that began as soon as he found a sympathetic ear (the therapist).

This therapeutic proposition has nothing to do with handing out advice. Its aim is not to encourage a particular social stance, whether integration or marginalization. Each person's suffering is very different. It finds expression in the group, which is a living body, and which reacts, sometimes violently. A. was questioned by the group because he used the latter to try to recreate himself. This essential dimension produced by the group created the boy's own power to transform himself and this gave the impression of inexplicable and unexplained magic.

At the last session, A. asked me if he had « the right to do for others the work that I had done for them » (sic). I replied that whatever the future held, that would be a good going-away present for me, and he confirmed, as if it were necessary, that he had accepted by proposition. He has decided to continue living separately from his mother, but they have both learned to communicate in a satisfactory way, to respect each other, help each other and ask for love which are the gifts-counter-gifts of the Liberian family, and perhaps also the universal family. ■

TELEX

→ Updated 4.10.04 Liberia: first official returns

The HCR launched the official voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees process on October 1st. For the moment this mainly concerns people originally from Grand Cape Mount county. By January 1st 2005, 30 000 people should be on their way home from Ghana and other neighbouring countries. There are still major question marks as to the future of these refugees, in a country where nothing is really ready for their return – neither infrastructure nor health services. As concerns security, the 19 000 UN soldiers seem to be keeping a large part of Liberia stable. However there are certain counties which are far from stable, especially Lofa, which is where most of the refugees and displaced in camps are from.

LIBERIA, ONE YEAR LATER ...

A little more than a year after Charles Taylor's departure and the arrival of the first United Nations troops, what is the situation in Liberia? Officially, more than 70 000 fighters have been disarmed, and thousands of refugees in the surrounding countries have started to return spontaneously. The official process of repatriating 100 000 refugees (there are still about 350 000 living Liberia's borders, of which 60 000 in Sierra Leone) should start in October, even before the end of disarmament, and continue until the end of the year. However, entire regions are far from being secure, while one out of six Liberians, according to the WFP (World Food Programme), is still dependent on aid for food. In the

Bong camps and around Monrovia, tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (about 80 000) are still waiting to be able to return home. Like many refugees, many of them come from Lofa, a region that has been devastated by the fighting and is still occupied by armed guards. Returning to their home region therefore remains hypothetical.

The situation in Liberia is very fragile. Its regional prospects are also uncertain, with the conflict in the Ivory Coast far from being settled, and economic and political tension in Guinea.

MSF / September 2004 / Laurence Hugues

→ Kigali, April 1994

I was astonished to see organised militias, albeit a bit chaotic; to see that the army was regularly supplying them with weapons at militia checkpoints and barriers.

Jean-Hervé Bradol, 'La commémoration amnésique des humanitaires', *Humanitaire*, N° 10, Spring/Summer 2004.

The stories about Rwanda are strangely reminiscent of those that we heard at the start of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. There is talk of inter-ethnic confrontation, ancestral hate being dragged up to incite fighting between opposing tribes. It is almost revisionism, these were mechanised, industrialised pogroms using grenades and machetes, programmed and created by well-identified groups.

Rony Brauman, President's Annual Report - MSF France, May 1994.



QUALIFYING, SPEAKING OUT AND ASSISTANCE

The Genocide in Rwanda

Translated by Laura Ball and Rachel Leeson

On 23rd April 2004 a debate was held at rue St Sabin, attended by several speakers from Médecins Sans Frontières. Marc Le Pape, a sociologist and member of the Board of Directors, summarises this discussion below. The debate was organised to mark the publication of a collection of documents on the genocide in Rwanda published by MSF².

Once past and gone, nobody refuted the genocide that had taken place in Rwanda. But how did MSF gradually realise that this was indeed a case of systematic extermination? Did this realisation affect the way that operations were carried out in Rwanda and the public statements made internationally? How can we learn from this unique experience in terms of current situations where large-scale political crimes are committed? Has it become necessary to exploit the term 'genocide' - is this now the trigger for action, in whose absence nothing will be taken seriously?

Marc Le Pape : During the commemoration of the genocide in April 2004, I was taken aback by certain schemas. Rwandan Hutus were often depicted as a single entity of machete wielding killers. It is

important to be wary of this representation, which contradicts the surveys carried out across Rwanda, particularly the research upon which Leave None to tell the Story (FIDH, HRW, 1999) is based. This book is still the main public source of verified information about the extermination methods used against the Tutsis in Rwanda. The genocide was actively planned by a group of political and military personnel. The plan was then carried out by militias, military personnel and civilians. First the militia and military were called into action. The massacres, especially those in churches, showed the machetes were used to carry out killings, but that these were not the only weapons, far from it: military firearms were also used to carry out this organised extermination.

The extent and the criminal efficiency of military involvement in these massacres are evident; but this role is pushed into the background and overshadowed by the schemas and stories that have emerged during the commemoration period. In 2004, it is common to talk about the systematic extermination of Tutsis in terms of 'machete genocide', a description alluding to the notion that all Rwandan Hutus are responsible. MSF was in Rwanda before April 1994 (when the genocide began) but this was not the first example of the systematic extermination of Rwandan Tutsis. The first time was in November 1958 and again several times between 1958 and 1973, hence the innate fear of extermination. MSF first thought it was a confrontation between two ethnic groups - a very bloody civil war.



da

Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier : The 'MSF Speaking out' case study on Rwanda shows how difficult it was to qualify the situation, to say 'this is genocide'. Genocide does not just refer to killing or massacring a large number of people; it refers specifically to the intention to exterminate a particular group. An intention however is not visible: to recognise it requires political analysis. Genocide is not on a higher level emotionally than massacre, the difference is in the intention behind the action: this is extermination, it is not only frightening people and forcing them to leave their homes or into submission. Humanitarian law encourages and regulates humanitarian action in situations of conflict, allowing protection and assistance to reach both direct and indirect victims of armed violence, and to punish 'mistakes

committed during conflicts - particularly war crimes and crimes against humanity. But when the military objective is the physical elimination of the population, no humanitarian aid can guarantee their survival. For this reason, the 1948 Genocide Convention made it compulsory for countries to intervene, whether alone or with the UN, to prevent and punish actions that are beyond humanitarian management of conflicts defined by the Geneva Convention in 1949. Genocide is beyond the limit of humanitarian action- this is why qualification is so important. It is interesting to study how we came to our positions in 1994. The journey was not faultless or infallible and this is explained in the MSF 'Speaking Out' case study. This document helps understand the different arguments, dilemmas and

reasoning that were used at the time, and hopefully make us better prepared for current operational challenges, especially those concerning violence and crimes committed against the people we assist.

Rony Brauman : The interest of this document on the genocide in Rwanda is to prevent any heroic a posteriori reconstruction - it juxtaposes personal memories with documents written during the period in question, i.e. before anyone knew how it would end. This means that we can closely study the events without knowing the outcome.

I would like to share my personal memories of the events; I was president of MSF until 1st May 1994, during the first weeks of the genocide. I remember what I was thinking at the time and with hindsight, I can see that it was very different from what one might expect. At MSF Rwanda was on the one hand Burundian refugee camps and on the other the internally displaced people (IDPs) since 1990 caused by the war. There was also the problem of security: every night we wondered what things would be like when we woke the next day. Would the explosion that everyone predicted happen during the night, or would it be days or months later? There was the omnipresent threat of civil war and the localised problems of refugees and IDPs.

After the 6th April, when the aircraft carrying the Rwandan president was attacked and the violence exploded, we were all thinking of a liberian-somalian schema. We were coming out of, or still involved in, these types of conflict. It is with this type of schema in mind that we witnessed the emergence of violence, I deliberately use this vague term to emphasise the fact that we did not see any perceivable difference. Especially since, during April 1994, MSF had been present throughout the siege in the Bosnian Muslim town of Gorazde. We thought we were faced with the threat of extermination - not only against the population but also against our team and ourselves. Most of our energy was dedicated to establishing radio links between the Gorazde team and the outside world, believing that it was their only remaining lifeline. What followed showed the risk had been overestimated, but we didn't realise at the time.

These were our concerns, the schemas on our minds. The decision to reduce the peacekeeping force in Rwanda seemed inevitable. After the experiences in Somalia, Liberia and Bosnia - the failure of peacekeepers in these conflicts as a means of intervention - I could understand the decision. At the time it did not shock me in the slightest.

People began to realise that genocide was taking place in the third week of April. We can date it fairly precisely as several articles were published at that time by researchers, notably Jean-Pierre Chrétien . By the end of April, I

"The interest of this document on the genocide in Rwanda is to prevent any heroic a posteriori reconstruction"

was convinced that a genocide was taking place but this did not directly affect our field operations. It took time for us to change how we saw our responsibility - from being in the field and seeking to act immediately, to something else.

People started to use the word 'genocide' in May, but there was no before/after. The image of a moment when the curtain fell and reality appeared is a false one. In reality it was something much more progressive, a continuous mutation - not a sudden shock.

Jean-Hervé Bradol : The realisation was not brutal, but the consequences could have been brutal if people had not realised, and the later it happened the worse the consequences would have been.

We claim, sometimes pathetically, to be able to access the epicentre of crises. In Rwanda, several MSF teams were present in places where the genocide was happening. There was no 'access problem' to the genocide. We were there in the field, and the only acceptable position was to oppose it, a position with practical consequences. As we were convinced that the priority was not to remain neutral and to organise help, but instead to oppose what was happening, we decided to do things that we would not normally do. For example try to save people, whom the militia accused of being secret agents



“

I was already working in Tanzania when the refugees arrived in Benaco... It was the first time that I'd ever seen such a large influx of refugees... I could see that the refugees were organised, but I didn't realise that they were killers.”

Nicolas de Torrente, MSF administrator in Tanzania from November 1993 until June 1994: Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994 (MSF Speaking Out Collection), p. 30.

... preparing terrorist attacks, from extermination. There was a counter-insurrectional dimension to the discourse, especially when these people were our own staff, it was logical to actively help them. There were plenty of other occasions where we had to oppose what was happening. The interim government, who had organised the genocide, authorised ICRC and MSF to intervene in Kigali. It respected the hospital's perimeter and outbuildings, which were used as convalescence homes. They did not do this out of the kindness of their hearts; it was undoubtedly because they thought there was some political benefit to be gained. To me, it would have been absurd to stay there and use that as an excuse to keep quiet, and to not express opposition to the genocide. The next problem was stopping material aid reaching those committing the crimes. Refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania were run by the people who had organised the genocide. This was not abstract - they were taking taxes from the salaries paid by MSF. We could see how the aid system was benefiting them on a daily basis. Whilst they should have been

providing them medical care, hospital staff at Benaco, in Tanzania would kill any children that they thought were Tutsis. There was always a serious risk that the aid would be intercepted by extremely violent political players, among them the perpetrators of the genocide, and would eventually be turned against those people that it was intended to benefit. That's briefly the difficulties we faced working in the field.

“To me, it would have been absurd to stay there and use that as an excuse to keep quiet, and to not express opposition to the genocide.”

→ **Question : How did you come to publish on 17-18 June: “Doctors cannot stop genocide”?**

R.B. : That decision was taken in June, after several weeks of procrastination. By mid-May people were beginning to talk of genocide. Jean-Hervé, who had come back from Kigali, represented MSF France as a guest on the eight o'clock television

news, during which he was critical of France. He spoke of genocide and implicated France in the responsibility for that genocide.

Juppé, the Pope, various important people, researchers, etc., were taking a position on the matter, and it was only in mid-June — because of organisational constraints regarding other sections and because of the problem of risks in the field — that we came to issue our slogan. With hindsight it was practically at the end of the genocide — the genocide came to an end in July with the victory of the RFP.

During the two-and-a half-month period from 6 April to 17 June we worked while knowing to a certain extent that a genocide was going on. Reginald Moreels, then president of MSF Belgium published a Carte Blanche article in Le Soir, in which he spoke of genocide, but spoke of it in terms of a particularly serious massacre.

There is a considerable difference between the legal definition of genocide referred to by Françoise and the common usage of the word. It was spoken of as being practically a genocide but we were still far from stating “it's genocide”, which would have implied a specific crime which had been organised and planned, and aimed at a specific population with the intention of completely obliterating it. Genocide was a particularly horrific massacre. It was only in June that we regarded it as a specific crime. That was when MSF issued the slogan “Doctors cannot stop genocide”. It was a way for us to express the limitations of our action in this context, but it should be remembered that neither is it possible for doctors to stop a cholera epidemic, a famine, a massacre or a war either. It should not be taken too seriously, it was only a well-received publicity slogan after all. It was what we had to do, a bit late in the day. Obviously the idea was: send in the troops; it was a call to arms.

→ **Question : Is it normal that MSF took so long to realise what was happening?**

J-H.B. : Over the last ten years that has been one of the most frequently asked questions. At first, when we used the word genocide, it was, as Rony said, to differentiate a massacre more horrific than any other, but the



→ Rwanda, Transit camp in Rwabusoro © Roger Job - 1994

vast majority of us did not really understand what the specific political and legal dimension actually meant. It took some time, just over two months.

R.B. : For various reasons, particularly my work on Eichmann, I had a more precise idea of the nature of genocide from a legal, historical and political point of view. But it was not enough to know the precise legal and political meaning of the term genocide in order to give it the emphasis that in retrospect it should have been given. It was not a case of: "There is a genocide going on in Rwanda; I know this; I understand this". To start with there wasn't really any proof; there was an array of very convincing presumptions and researchers were convinced. But that did not have any immediate consequences in terms of our operations. First and foremost there was a war going on,

"it was only in mid-June — because of organisational constraints regarding other sections and because of the problem of risks in the field — that we came to issue our slogan. With hindsight it was practically at the end of the genocide"

there were injured people, problems caused by the war. Genocide was spoken of, but that did not affect our other concerns, which at that stage were equally very important. This explains the period of several weeks between the moment when it was acknowledged that "there is a genocide" and the moment when this had practical public consequences.

J-H.B. : Alain Juppé, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, told the French National Assembly "There is a genocide in Rwanda". The issue was not so much the use of the word but the need to act accordingly.

→ **Question :** Often, genocides tend to be spoken of in quantitative terms, in terms of numbers massacred. Does genocide necessarily mean extermination of everybody? Destroying identities, exterminating "only" the men — can that not also be legally identified as genocide?

F.B-S. : Genocide, according to the 1948 Convention, means acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The Convention refers to direct killing, but also to factors which lead to the physical destruction of a group in a

The Convention uses the phrase "the intention to destroy, in whole or in part". What does 'in part' mean? It is not necessary to have had the intention of exterminating the entire group. Part of the group may be situated outside the borders. Exterminating the part of the group under



→ Rwanda, Transit camp in Rwabuzoro © Roger Job - 1994

deferred way, such as prevention of births within the group. It was in relation to the notion of prevention of births that the massacre of all of the men of a group, as was the case in Srebrenica, was described as an act of genocide by the tribunal on the former Yugoslavia. Similarly the rapes committed in Rwanda were also qualified as a specific act of genocide.

The extermination can either be immediate or deferred, but it is always involves killing people, not just depriving them of their culture or language. The notion of cultural genocide is not recognised by the 1948 Convention.

your control, within a given territory, is enough. Otherwise, it could be claimed that the genocide of the Jews did not happen in that the group was not totally wiped out. Genocide does not mean that everyone dies. We should not try to reclassify all crimes committed against civilians as genocide. The definition of war crime and crimes against humanity complete the description of the different international crimes which the International Criminal Court is today responsible for repressing.

R.B. : Some analysts have begun to reassess the 1948 definition, parti-

cularly as it tends to consider religion and race as almost natural groups. The definition is fragile and questionable. If anyone is to be blamed for rendering the definition absolutely unintelligible, i.e., making it impossible to interpret, it's the International Criminal Court, in describing Srebrenica as a genocide — a philosophical scandal in my opinion. All racist crime, all political crime will come to be considered genocide; in other words, there is no longer anything unique about this type of crime which used to be set apart for the very purpose of drawing attention to it. It's the only crime which has its own specific Convention.

J-H.B. : When the key players are radically violent (culminating during a genocide), humanitarian workers must ensure that the aid they bring is not used against the victims. They don't need to be legal or historical experts to cope with the situation and limit the damage.

It takes time to get to grips with a situation and begin to realise the harm that humanitarian workers can cause.

Consider this example. We arrived in Kigali on 13 April 1994. It took me a good week to realise that what was underway in that city was a planned and organised extermination of people, and that it was going on in every part of the city — except the part controlled by the RPF. We used to go to collect the injured from a religious institution in the centre of Kigali — the Sainte Famille. We treated them in our hospital, and, once they were convalescing — as is our practice — we took them back home; brought them that is to a

"The Convention uses the phrase 'the intention to destroy, in whole or in part'. What does 'in part' mean? It is not necessary to have had the intention of exterminating the entire group."

place where they were to be exterminated. They would have had a much better chance of survival had we kept them in hospital. During that first week I myself took people from that institution and accompanied them back to the institution, where it was highly likely they were killed.

•••

•••

R.B. : I would like to come back to what lies beneath the idea of a massacre carried out with bladed weapons, with killings involving everyone against everyone else — “machete genocide” to use Hatzfeld’s phrase [ndlr: Jean Hatzfeld - “Une saison de machettes, éditions du Seuil]. If the killings were carried out primarily with bladed weapons then the numbers killed would be due to the fact that (almost) all

Hutus participated. The idea is that all Hutus were mobilised and that they therefore can be collectively accused of genocide. This argument gives comfort to the regime of terror set up by the RPF in Rwanda. And the NGOs which took part in the commemorations are unconsciously associating themselves with the justification of an indiscriminate repression of all Rwandan Hutus.

→ **Question** : The word genocide is often used to mean an excess of maliciousness or immorality. That meaning masks the political character of acts of genocide. Isn’t the concept of genocide weighed down by moral obsessions; in its usage today hasn’t the word lost the particular meaning it was given in 1948? On a more practical level, is it the role of an aid organisation like MSF to label situations? Is it MSF’s responsibility?

“*Action in Rwanda today means using the army to put an end to the genocide. It means freeing the captive populations, hostages, before they are put to death. It means neutralising the armed groups at the vanguard of the slaughter.*”

Rony Brauman, “Humanitarian ethos versus duty of humanity”, *Le Monde*, 30 June 1994, *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi-1994*, MSF Speaking Out Collection, p. 60.

“*I heard a dozen times the complaint « You called for Operation Turquoise ». I would reply, “Did you ever hear us call for unilateral French military intervention to undertake humanitarian work? Where? Which document was that ? Which of us made that declaration?”*”

Jean-Hervé Bradol, *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi-1994*, MSF Speaking Out Collection p. 61



→ Rwanda, Transit camp in Rwabusoro © Roger Job - 1994

J-H.B. : The point of classifying crimes is to punish them. To carry out the punishment of crimes a hierarchy must be established. So, the fact that the massacre of the Rwandan Tutsis is not considered to be just another crime against humanity, allows those responsible to be arrested, accused and convicted.

I agree that the wide use of the term genocide is confusing; but its use also has a positive knock-on effect: it means those responsible can be tried and ostracised from society.

In '94, during the genocide, were we wrong to call for an armed intervention? I think we were right to do it. (...) Over the last ten years I have not seen anything like the serious crisis that occurred in Rwanda.

R.B. : I don't think that labelling situations is MSF's responsibility. There may be circumstances in which it is a real issue. But overall the classifying of crimes occurring in situations where MSF is intervening, comes very far down our list of priorities. Currently in the United States (this April), people are either completely ignoring the issue of Darfur or hyping it up as a genocide. It's either one or the other, as though beyond genocide, there's nothing of interest. Any crime which is not genocide is not big news. There is a vast range of crimes... There are crimes other than genocide which are extremely large-scale and serious — what's happening in Darfur for example — and we do not need the label of genocide to know when it is time to



→ Rwanda, Rwandese refugee orphan in Ruhango, © Roger Job - July 1994

act. The UN is fuelling this as was the case with Srebrenica... For fear of being slow, of being accused again, as in the case of Rwanda where as we know restrictions were imposed on the United Nations Assistance Mission by Kofi Annan, then head of the department of peace-keeping operations.

J-H.B. : I do not entirely agree. We have an obligation to assess situations for ourselves, but not necessarily from a legal point of view. This leads us at times to describe various actors as a gang of hardened killers: a kind of diagnosis or labelling.

In Rwanda, it was necessary to state that a genocide was occurring. We cannot justify not speaking out just because we are a humanitarian organisation. Following the logic of rejecting the principle of classification amounts to claiming that labelling the events going on before our very eyes in Rwanda was of no importance.

→ Question : In this case the label genocide brought about calls for armed intervention...

R.B. : I still maintain that this is not our job. We must be quite clear about this. I believe we should never call for armed intervention in the name of

MSF. I have changed my mind on this since 1994.

J-H.B. : In '94, during the genocide, were we wrong to call for an armed intervention? I think we were right to do it. I think in certain situations humanitarian organisations must recognise that violence has its uses. I believe that when faced with a large-scale process of extermination, saying that the only way to put an end to it is by means of violence, is a position I believe I would take again. Over the last ten years I have not seen anything like the serious crisis that occurred in Rwanda. ■

1- Laurence Binet (project coordinator), Françoise Bouchet-Sautnier (legal director at the Foundation), Jean-Hervé Bradol (president of Médecins Sans Frontières), Rony Brauman (research director at the Crash) and Marc Le Pape (member of the Board of Directors).

2- *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsis – 1994* – MSF 'Speaking out' Collection, written and edited by Laurence Binet. This first case study, published in October 2003, traces the work of the MSF movement during these events. It presents the internal debate that

preceded, accompanied and followed the decisions taken and public statements. Debates such as those on recognising and qualifying the genocide in Rwanda, or those sparked by the French section's appeal for armed intervention from the UN (17-18th June 94), or the discussion on protecting Rwandan Tutsi personnel working with MSF sections.

3- Security Council, 21 April 1994, resolution 912.

4- Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 'Un nazisme tropical', *Libération*, 26 April 1994.

5- Appeal by MSF France published in *Le*

Monde on 18 June 1994, *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi-1994*, MSF Speaking Out Collection, p. 52.

6- Jean-Hervé Bradol interviewed on the TF1 news of 16 May 1994. Patrick Poivre d'Arvor concluded the interview saying: "It was high time someone spoke out forcefully about what is happening over there, as it really is genocide.", script of the interview, *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi-1994*, MSF Speaking Out Collection p. 35-36.

7- "Opinion sur la crise du Rwanda", Dr Reginald Moreels, on behalf of Médecins Sans Frontières, *Le Soir*,

Brussels, 6 May 1994, *Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi-1994*, MSF Speaking Out Collection p. 29-30.

8- On this subject see Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La concurrence des victimes. Génocide, identité, reconnaissance*, La Découverte, 1997.

9- In January 1994, Kofi Annan prevented the UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) led by General Dallaire from carrying out raids on the militia's arms cache. The militia were preparing to "exterminate the Tutsis" in Kigali. Roméo Dallaire, *J'ai serré la main du diable*, [Libre expression-2004].



EXPATRIATION

National staff volunteering to leave on mission

MSF / September 2004 / Cécile Aujaleu, coordinator of national staff / Translated by Christopher Scala

In response to the growing number of national staff volunteering to leave on mission as expatriates, Cécile Aujaleu underlines the commitment involved in becoming a volunteer and explains the procedure to follow and the possibilities of progressing as an expatriate.

→ Specifically for emergency missions

Following the development of the national staff database (slated for 2005), we will be able to draw up a list of people capable of responding to an emergency in their area of expertise. This may entail their leaving their country for several months on an emergency mission: they then return to their position when they go back to their country. The conditions governing these specific procedures will be defined in 2005.

→ Sudan © Michael Zumstein / L'oeil public - August 2004



→ Iran © Sebastian Bolesch - September 2004

In order to improve our programmes, it is important to encourage national staff members to shoulder increased responsibilities (through intermediate supervisory positions, transfer to different sites, access to internal training programmes, and opportunities to fill coordination positions). Becoming an expatriate is no longer the only way to secure a coordination position within the association. For anyone seeking to go on mission as an expatriate, taking on increased responsibilities in one's own country is now a preferred (but not obligatory) first step. However, this step does not guarantee becoming an expatriate volunteer. An application procedure must be followed, and several criteria must be met.

→ A VOLUNTARY PROCESS

We do not have an active policy for sending national staff on missions as expatriate volunteers. It is a voluntary process – an adjective that underlines the individual commitment, the desire to participate in a collective action and agree to abide by the Charter. 'Volunteer' also means the desire, motivated by a spirit of solidarity, to work with populations and to open up to other cultures as well as to speak out about the realities encountered. However this project also entails certain risks and constraints that the volunteer must accept (see box below). It also requires that the applicant resign from his position in his/her home country, which makes the process more difficult. For this reason this process cannot be actively promoted: it is strictly a personal decision.

→ PERSPECTIVES AS AN EXPATRIATE

An accepted candidate will be proposed an initial expatriate post (between six months and one year in length, depending on the position)

PRACTICAL INFORMATION ON EXPATRIATE STATUS

Applicants for expatriate missions need to know the practical conditions of leaving on mission as an expatriate with MSF: these are identical for all expatriates. The "carnet de route" is available on all missions to check all the detailed information about what is and what isn't paid for. It is important that the applicant be aware of the following points:

- Even if the expatriation application is accepted, the waiting time can sometimes be long (several months) before an offer is made to go on a mission.
- There is no guarantee of continuity between missions: at the end of each mission, an evaluation is carried out to determine whether a subsequent mission is appropriate.
- MSF does not pay any stipend or cover any expenses during the waiting period between two missions.
- MSF does not pay for families except for people in coordination positions.
- There is no guaranteed position when returning to the country of origin: when returning from a mission, the person does not get his old position back. The person may be offered a position depending on the needs of the mission, but this is not guaranteed at all.
- A person cannot have expatriate status in his/her own country: a person who has been an expatriate and who returns to a position in his own country will be reassigned the status of national employee.



corresponding to his/her abilities. If this first experience is positive (end of mission evaluation) and the volunteer wishes to continue on another mission, s/he will have the possibility of evolving into other types of position (including coordination positions) in the field – like Doctor Norbert Ebenga Zula who is today field coordinator in Betou, Congo

Brazzaville (see interview next page) after eight months of mission.

→ CRITERIA FOR EXPATRIATE VOLUNTEERS

For a candidate's application to be considered, he/she must meet a

number of training-related criteria (medical, logistics, management or other) as defined by the relevant departments (identical for all expatriates). Once this "compatibility" is verified, at least two years of professional experience within MSF is required before the first mission. The human resources department

favours applicants who are available for a one-year period, along with those who speak French or English. Knowledge of both languages offers broader opportunities. ■

For further information on the decision process, please contact headquarters.



From one Congo to another

MSF / September 2004 / interview by Aurélie Grémaud / Translated by Mary Davis

Doctor Norbert Ebenga-Zula worked with MSF for three years as a national employee in his home country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In July 2003, he went on mission as an expatriate doctor. First field coordinator for a nutritional program in Niger, Norbert now works in Bétou, in Congo-Brazzaville.

→ How did you decide to go on mission as an expatriate with MSF?

I was recruited by MSF when I was working in a camp for displaced people which was around 45 minutes north of Kinshasa by car. I met some MSF volunteers who later on asked me if I wanted to work with the association. I accepted. After a few months discovering what MSF was and what it did in different parts of the world, I wanted to leave to work in a country other than my own, on different issues. Very soon I talked about becoming an expatriate with my field coordinator at the time and the head of mission, and then the human resources officer. They explained that there was a process to respect, including the fact that I first needed to work for two years in my home country before being able to leave on mission as an expatriate. I also had to send a letter of motivation to Paris, and then get the agreement from my head of mission and medical coordinator.

→ What did you think of this required waiting period? Did it surprise you, or seem unjust?

No, it didn't surprise me. On the contrary, I understand why it's important, and for several reasons. First of all, it's an opportunity to understand how things work, how MSF works in the field. It's also important on a human level. You can see and understand how volunteers

react far from their families, in stressful conditions, living around the clock with different people who have different cultural backgrounds and habits. It's not always easy to be the only local staff member living with expatriates. You have to get used to the new environment. But I don't think this rule needs to be set in stone, and I especially believe that the 'why' of these two years needs to be better explained.

→ What did you get out of three years working with MSF in your home country?

I learned a lot by working as "national staff": for example living in precarious conditions, working with new material and new medicine that had not been available to me before. It was horrible to be faced with a disease that we were familiar with and knew how to treat but couldn't because we lacked the medicine. For example, with malaria, we could do nothing except observe the predictable evolution of the disease, until the patient died. So working with MSF was wonderful: I was finally able to treat patients!

→ When you became an expatriate, what were the main difficulties you encountered?

The management of expatriate staff is harder than that of local staff. Small misunderstandings become quickly much more acute when being around each other all the time. Each person has his/her own personality, and

ideas about what MSF is and what we should do. When you're field coordinator, it's not always easy to make others understand the goals and the choice of the program. You have to devote a lot of time to discussion, which can sometimes be exhausting. Another thing that's hard is when you arrive in a team that's already set up, and you have to introduce a change in the direction of the programs. It's important that people don't think the work they previously did was useless but at the same time they need to understand MSF's need to change approaches and to redefine the orientation of its programs.

This work of discussion and persuasion constitutes a large part of a field coordinator's work, and I don't think it's harder if you've been "national staff" before or not. However, what can make a difference is previous professional experience—whether you've had teams to manage before or not, for example. I don't think you're treated any differently because you've been national staff. I've always felt a sense of mutual respect with the teams that I've worked with.

→ Does having worked as "national staff" before add anything in particular to the way you work?

I think I try to listen better, to be closer and more pedagogical because I'd been "national staff" previously. From the beginning, I explain who I am and where I come

from. I tell them I've been national staff, like them, and that we are there to work together. This makes people curious, because very few of them imagine it is possible for them to work elsewhere. The fact that I've been national staff allows me to bring up certain sensitive subjects more easily – is particularly as I recognize their work, show consideration for the teams, and it shows. The people we work with have knowledge to impart, just as we have things to teach them. It's a question of teamwork and synergy, not of an expatriate who arrives, claims to know more than the others, and believes he/she is contributing everything. I also think that because I've been an MSF employee before I was a volunteer, I know how to transmit ideas smoothly, in order to improve things.

On the other hand, I think it is a shame there is not more briefing on the context and culture of the country volunteers are going to be working in. For example, they might know they're going on a cholera or malnutrition mission, but they don't know how they will be accepted culturally.

→ And now?

I still have time to go on mission again with MSF. Afterwards, like everybody, I'll need to stop. But I think I have several great years ahead of me! ■

INFOS

WATCH AND READ

PRESS REVUE

MSF / October 2004 / Phoiba Monteiro / Translated by Julia Maitland

→ Afghanistan

At the end of July, two months after the deaths of our five colleagues in Afghanistan, MSF announced that our teams were leaving the country and our programmes stopped. This announcement was widely covered by the media. The daily newspaper *Ouest France* published a special report entitled: "Aid workers' mission impossible". Journalists asked, "Is it still possible for aid workers to be considered as neutral in the field?".

→ Iraq

The hostage taking of two Italian aid workers in Baghdad led to the withdrawal of several organisations from Iraq. "In an occupied country, all those contributing to its rebuilding are seen as back-up troops for the occupying power", said Françoise B. Saulnier. Dr Jean Hervé Bradol criticised the dangerous confusion between humanitarianism and politics, claiming that NGOs must clearly defend their independence. (*Le Monde* September 9, 2004).

→ Haiti

Following hurricane Jeanne on September 17 and 18, the country is still counting the dead and missing. "The worst is transferring seriously injured patients that we are unable to treat on site, the extremely serious shortages in water, food, treatment and shelter" (statement from MSF for "l'Humanité", September 22, 2004).

MSF SPEAKING OUT

The hunting and killing of Rwandan refugees...

MSF / September 2004 / Laurence Binet / Translated by Carole Patton

The CRASH has added a fifth volume to the 'MSF Speaking Out' collection case studies, at the request of the MSF international movement: the fourth and last in a series dedicated to the Crisis of the Great Lakes region during the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis, and the three years that followed.

This volume addresses the period from October 1996 to October 1997. During that year, Laurent Désiré Kabila's ADFL rebel troops (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire), and Paul Kagame's regime-led RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army), attacked the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, then hunted down the escapees, through the forests of Zaire across to Congo-Brazzaville, in a concerted effort to kill them all.

At every stage of this bloody exodus, MSF attempted to bring aid to the survivors and to bring their existence to the attention of the international community by publicly denouncing what was happening to them.

In this way, in autumn 1996, MSF called for an international military operation to establish protected refugee areas. MSF warned of the death risk that threatened more than 13,000 refugees, kept out of reach of aid. Then they drew attention to the fact that not all refugees had returned, contrary to the assertions of the Rwandan government.

In 1997, the organisation publicly denounced, in its press releases and reports, the Human Rights' violations, the massacres that their teams knew

about, and the forced repatriation of sick refugees to Rwanda.

These public statements were sometimes slow in coming and followed internal debates over the key dilemmas that the situation raised:

- Could MSF publicize mere estimates of the conditions of these refugees and their health needs, in light of the fact that we had no access to them? Conversely, given lack of access, should MSF refrain from communicating these catastrophic predictions? Is it wise for a humanitarian organization to predict the worst?
- Given that MSF was being used to lure refugees, should the organization cease activities in the area or pursue them, denouncing this manipulation in the hope of preventing massacres - but at the risk of endangering its teams and its other operations in the region?
- Should MSF call for the refugees to remain in eastern Zaire, with its deadly dangers, or participate in their forced repatriation to Rwanda, where their security was not guaranteed either?

This episode in MSF's history is described by a chronological montage

of extracts from documents and interviews, linked together by short texts. The volume also contains a detailed chronology, maps, lists of abbreviations, and of the people interviewed and MSF reports quoted. All is available in both English and French versions. The next volume of MSF Speaking Out, 'Famine and Forced Transfers of the Population in Ethiopia 1984 - 1985' should be published at the end of 2004.

As and when they are published, the MSF Speaking Out case studies are distributed to the departments, desks and field teams by the Heads of Mission. They are also available at the documentation centre. Additional copies can be obtained from the CRASH and the communications department. ■

Please send your comments to:
lbinet@paris.msf.org

Already published: "Salvadoran Refugee Camps in Honduras - 1988" - "Genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis - 1994" - "Rwandan Refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania 1994 - 1995" - "The Violence of the New Rwandan Government - 1994 - 1995"


Home and away

Rip Hopkins / September 2004

'Home and Away' is a photo-reportage of the displaced population in Uzbekistan by Rip Hopkins, photographer for the Agency 'Vu'. A Soviet invention, Uzbekistan groups together a multitude of ethnic communities many of which were deported here by the Stalin regime: Germans, Polish, Greeks, Russians, Koreans and Tartars amongst others. Through portraits and compositions, 99

photographs rebuild the history of these "non-Uzbeks" now emigrating back to their home countries. Each photograph carries a caption and a few words describing the past of those photographed. .

Born in England in 1972, Rip Hopkins has carried out a number of photographic and documentary reports for Médecins Sans Frontières. ■



New books available in the documentation centre

MSF / Alix Minvielle

→ **MEDICAL**

CONSÉQUENCES DES MALTRAITANCES SEXUELLES : RECONNAÎTRE, SOIGNER, PRÉVENIR / N. Horassius et P. Mazet (dir.).- Paris : Fédération française de psychiatrie, 2004.-595 p.

DONNÉES SUR LA SITUATION SANITAIRE ET SOCIALE EN FRANCE EN 2003 / DREES.- Paris : La Documentation française, 2004.-

[coll. Etudes et statistiques].- 345 p.

MANUEL DE PSYCHIATRIE TRANSCULTURELLE : TRAVAIL CLINIQUE, TRAVAIL SOCIAL / M. R. Moro, Q. De La Noë, Y. Mouchenik.- Grenoble : La pensée sauvage, 2004.- 397 p.

→ **GÉOPOLITIQUE**

LA GUERRE DE L'EAU AURA-T-ELLE LIEU ? / T-D Nguyen.- Paris : éditions Johanet, 2004.- 238 p.

LES ONG / P. Ryfman.- Paris : La Découverte, 2004.- (Coll. Repères).- 122 p.

ONG ET HUMANITAIRE / J. Siméant et P. Dauvin (dir.).- Paris : L'Harmattan, 2004.-276 p.

REQUIEM FOR THE SUDAN : WAR, DROUGHT, ET DISASTER RELIEF ON THE NILE / J. Millard Burr, R. O. Collins.- Oxford : Westview press, 2004.- 385 p.

→ **THE MSF ON-LINE LIBRARY**

MSF/September 2004/Arnaud Robin, Rémi Vallet / Translated by Janet Wells

Want to read (or reread) the article Afghanistan : *l'humanitaire assassiné*, the book *Devant le mal : Rwanda, un génocide en direct*, or the *Santé pour tous en l'an 2000* debate? Need to urgently consult Epicentre's epidemiological study in Darfur or MSF's 2003-2004 Annual Report?

These documents (currently 160) are now accessible on the MSF website, and can be downloaded in PDF format. The MSF on-line library groups together a selection of reports, press dossiers and articles published by MSF, its members or colleagues. It also lists books like *Soigner malgré tout*, *A l'ombre des guerres justes* or *Le chardon tchéchène*, with a link to buy them on-line.

The MSF library also tracks the history of our association and presents documents from key moments (*Genèse de la campagne pour l'accès aux médicaments essentiels*, speech given on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, etc.).

This space is available to MSF members, journalists, students, researchers, humanitarian activists and anyone else who is interested. And this is just the beginning; the MSF library will get bigger and bigger. If you are not able to find a document that you think should be included, contact webmaster Arnaud Robin (arnaud.robin@msf.org).

→ **AVAILABLE IN THE DOCUMENTATION (and on int. database) - MSF / Christine Dufour / Andrea Bussotti**

Sudan : (Darfour : Mornay et Al-Geneina), août/septembre 2004, Michaël Zumstein / L'œil Public - **South Sudan** : (Paludisme et TB à Akuem), août 2004, Rémi Vallet / MSF - **Burundi** : (Etude Epicentre), août 2004, Sybille Gerstl / MSF - **Niger** : (CNT à Maradi), juin 2004, Julien Pouban / MSF

DRC : (Nut à Kayna), juillet 2004, Florence Reppel - Tarik Haddab / MSF - **China** : (Baoji, SIDA à Nanning), août 2004, Isabelle Merny / MSF - **Mozambique** : (SIDA), mars 2003, Martin Beaulieu - **Nepal** : (TB ward à Rukum), juillet 2004, Myrto Schaëfer / MSF - (Rukum), août 2004 Tomas Van Houtruyve

→ **Chechnya/Ossetia**

"The humanitarian situation in Chechnya is deteriorating, although Russian authorities are doing all they can to convince us that things are getting back to normal" said the newspaper La Croix (September 7, 2004). After the events in Beslan, "far from appeasing the tension, the authorities' silence and the restrictions imposed on the media spark further suspicions and encourage revenge" wrote Le Figaro (September 15, 2004).

→ **DRC/Burundi**

August 13, 2004, 160 Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese refugees were massacred in a camp in Burundi. "The responsibility for this massacre, perpetrated by automatic weapons and machetes, was soon claimed by a Burundian movement, the Forces nationales de Libération (FLN, Hutus)" reports the newspaper 'Libération' on August 16, 2004. And yet, the identity of the murderers' remains a subject of debate. The murders were condemned unanimously by the international community. At the same time, public prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo opened an inquiry into the crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), planning to target those with the greatest responsibility... (Le Monde, September 7 2004)

TRAINING (EPICENTRE)

→ **RESPONSE TO EPIDEMICS**

From 15th to 19th November 2004 in MSF Paris headquarters

Duration : 5 days

English speaking session

→ **TARGET GROUP**

Medical or Para-medical personnel with basic knowledge in epidemiology and at least one experience within an epidemic context.

Particularly : desk members, emergency coordinators, medical coordinators and field coordinators.

By the end of the course, the trainee will be able to:

- Detect an outbreak
 - Carry out an outbreak investigation
 - Define necessary strategies and organise effective management of epidemics
- Pathologies involved are : meningitis, diarrhoeal diseases, haemorrhagic fevers, malaria, measles and influenza.*

For further information and to apply: contact your desk and Epicentre
Isabelle Beauquesne (01 40 21 29 27) or Danielle Michel (01 40 21 29 48)



TURN OVER HEADQUARTERS

OPÉRATIONS

- **Guillermo BERTOLETTI** Guillermo has replaced Guillaume LE GALLAIS as Director of Operations.
- **Graziella GODAIN** Graziella has been appointed Deputy Director of Operations.
- **Giuseppe SCOLLO** Giuseppe has replaced Graziella as RP on desk F.
- **Annette HEINZELMANN** Annette has replaced Giuseppe as ARP. Annette is a doctor.
- **Pauline HERRILL** Pauline has replaced Christophe FOURNIER as RP on desk A. Pauline is a doctor.
- **Isabelle DEFOURNY** Isabelle has replaced Myrto SCHAEFER as ARP on desk E. Isabelle is a doctor.
- **Jean-Clément CABROL** Jean-Clément has left MSF.

RH TERRAIN

- **Anne-Louise JACQUEMIN** Anne-Louise is working as a project coordinator in the HR department until the end of 2004.
- **Ingrid FORD** Ingrid has replaced Ann SAUNDERS as HRO (human resources officer) on desk A.
- **Casey KEIDERLING** Casey will be helping 'bureau des départs' until the end of the year.
- **Emilie BIARE** Emilie has left after working as HRO since 2003.

FINANCES

- **Loïc SCHEIDER et Manuel COLIM** Loïc and Manuel left MSF in July.
- **David VICQUERY** David has replaced Loïc Schneider.

FONDATION

- **Fabrice WEISSMAN** Fabrice has returned to his position at the Foundation after a six month mission in Guinea.

EPICENTRE

- **Kathryn ALBERTI** Kathryn has joined Epicentre as an epidemiologist.

COMMUNICATION

- **Bénédicte JEANNEROD** Bénédicte started as deputy director of communications at the end of August.
- **Emeric LANGUERAND** Emeric left MSF in September.

MÉDICAL

- **Claire REYNAUD** Claire, a psychologist, has joined the department until May 2005.

POSITIONS TO FILL

→ FIELD VACANCIES

→ ASAP

- Head of mission (nurse), Malawi, Blantyre, 1 year
- Medical coordinator, Kenya, Nairobi, 1 year
- Head of mission (medical), Angola, Luanda, 1 year
- Medical Coordinator (medical/psychologist), Occupied Territories, Jerusalem, 1 year
- Head of mission (medical), Sierra Leone, Freetown, 6 months
- Head of mission, Darfur, El Jenina, 3-6 months
- Medical coordinator, Ethiopia, Addis, 1 year
- Medical coordinator, Liberia, Monrovia, 1 year
- Head of mission, Southern Sudan, Loki, 1 year
- Head of mission, China, Nanning 1 year
- Medical coordinator, Ivory Coast, Abidjan, 1 year
- Nurse field co, DRC, Kitengue, 6 months
- Nurse field co, Georgia, Akhmeta, 3 months
- Nurse field co, Darfur, Niertiti, 3-6 months
- Nurse field co, Darfur, Zalinguei, 3-6 months

- Medical/nurse field co, Congo, Betou, 6 months
- Nurse field co, Darfur, El Genina, 3-6 months
- Nurse field co, Chad, Adre, 3 months
- Nurse field co, Southern Sudan, Akuem, 6 months
- HIV medical, Uganda, Arua, 12 months
- medical, Darfur, El Genina, 3 months
- medical, Darfur, Zalinguei, 3-6 months
- medical, Darfur, Niertiti, 3-6 months
- medical, Cambodia, Kompong Cham, 12 months
- medical, Southern Sudan, Akuem, 6 months
- medical, Northern Sudan, Bentiu, 6 mois
- Nut nurse, DRC, Kayna, 6 months
- Wide-wife, DRC, Ankoro, 6 months
- Nurse, Darfur, Mornei, 3-6 months
- Nurse, Darfur, El Genina, 3 months
- Nut nurse, Southern Sudan, Akuem, 6 months
- Wide-wife, Ivory Coast, Bouake, 6 months
- Nurse, Darfur, Zalinguei, 3-6 months
- Psychologist, Colombia, Tolima, 6 months
- Nurse, Burundi, Makamba, 6 months
- Nut nurse, Niger, Maradi, 6 months

- Wide-wife, Darfur, Zalinguei, 3-6 months
- Nurse, Liberia, Bong, 6 months
- Nurse, DRC, Loko, 6 months
- Logistician field co, DRC, Beni, 6-9 months
- Logistician field co, Congo, Brazzaville, 12 months
- Logistician field co, Southern Sudan, Loki, 9 months
- Logistician officer bases in capital, DRC, Gbadolite, 6 months
- Logistician, Darfur, Zalinguei, 3-6 months
- Logistician field co, Darfur, El Genina, 3-6 months
- Logistician, Kenya, Homa Bay, 6 months
- Logistician, Chad, Adre, 3-6 months
- Builder logistician, Southern Sudan, Akuem, 6 months
- Logistician, Darfur, El Genina, 3-6 months
- Logistician field co, Liberia, Monrovia, 6 months
- Logistician field co, Northern Sudan, Khartoum, 6-12 months
- Head of HR, DRC, Lubumbashi, 6 months
- Administrator, Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 12 months
- Head of HR, Southern Sudan, Loki, 6-9 months

→ DÉCEMBER

- Medical coordinator, Darfur, El Genina, 3-6 months
- Head of mission (medical), Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 1 an
- Logistician field co, Liberia, Bong, 6 months
- Medical, Congo, Betou, 6 months
- Medical, Liberia, Bong, 6 months
- Medical, Liberia, Lofa, 6 months
- Medical, Darfur, Mornay, 3-6 months
- HIV medical, Kenya, Homa Bay, 1 year
- Medical, Iran, Mashad, 1 year
- Technical lab, Northern Sudan, Bentiu, 6 months
- Chemist, Kenya, Homa Bay, 12 months
- Psychologist, Congo, Brazzaville, 6 months
- Nurse, Darfur, Mornay, 3-6 months
- Nut nurse, DRC, Ankoro, 6 months
- FlyCo Logistician, Darfur, Nyala, 3-6 months
- Logistician, Congo, Mindouli, 6 months
- Logistician field co, Ivory Coast, Abidjan, 1 year
- Logistician, Northern Sudan, Bentiu, 6 months